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Abstract: Does the acquisition of ownership form a strict barrier to the application of EU 
consumer contract law rules? In particular: does the acquisition of ownership prevent a 
national court from reviewing unfair terms in a mortgage agreement? The CJEU said so in 
its recent judgement C-598/15 Banco Santander, where a bank itself acquired a mortgaged 
apartment in a forced sale. We consider this a too formal way of reasoning. In order to make 
a constructive suggestion of a better suited methodological alternative, we contrast this 
view by applying a ‘functional approach’ as developed in property law (especially Nordic and 
American). A ‘functional approach’ deals with each type of conflict directly and on its own 
merits, by involving various kinds of arguments relevant for the specific conflict without 
making the decision depend on broad general concepts like ‘ownership’. We conclude that 
this kind of approach offers an appropriate framework, in particular for the difficult task of 
determining the scope of the ‘principle of effectiveness’ of consumer contract law directives. 
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I. The Banco Santander Case as an Illustration 
A. The CJEU’s Use of ‘Ownership’ in a Consumer Contract Law Case 
In its recent judgement on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU)1 had to deal with the question of whether the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD)2 
can be applied after the enforcement of a mortgage contract between a consumer and a bank has 
already been completed. In that particular case, the creditor-bank which had itself acquired the 
mortgaged apartment in a forced sale sued the consumer-debtor to vacate the apartment. The 
referring Spanish court, in short, asks whether it can disapply certain national rules of civil 
procedure in order to protect the consumer. This question is based on the referring court’s 
consideration that national procedural law did not allow for an ex officio judicial review of unfair 
terms3 in the foregoing enforcement proceedings and that the consumer-debtor had no possibility 
to raise a defence on the ground that certain terms in the mortgage contract were unfair within 
the meaning of the Directive.4 
It is important to stress that, for the purposes of this article, we will not deal with the full set of 
facts of the Banco Santander case, nor will we deal with the full set of arguments taken into account 
by the Court in its decision. The focus will be on the role the acquisition of ownership – or in general 
the acquisition of a right in rem – should assume when deciding to apply, or not to apply, provisions 
to protect a consumer from the use of unfair contract terms. As far as relevant for that purpose, 
the facts of the case are as follows:  
A consumer took a loan to buy an apartment and agreed to secure the loan by way of a mortgage 
(hypothec) over this dwelling. The mortgage contract, apparently based on standard forms 
provided by the bank, stated that if the mortgage should be enforced under specific extra-judicial 
enforcement proceedings, the bank should be authorised to sign the contract of sale of the 
mortgaged property in the name of the consumer. It also stated a fixed value on the basis of which 
the mortgaged apartment should be assessed in order to determine the starting price in the 
                                                                
1  CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco SantanderSA v Cristobalina Sánchez López ECLI:EU:C:2017:945. The judgement has not 
received much attention yet: There is an (uncritical) case note by Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Keine Anwendung 
der Richtlinie 93/13/EG (missbräuchliche Klauseln) im Rahmen der Verwertung einer hypothekarischen Sicherheit, 
3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 75 (2018) and a short critical discussion provided in Wolfgang 
Faber and Astrid Graf-Wintersberger, Zivilrecht und Internationales Privatrecht, Schwerpunkt Verbraucherschutz, 
in JAHRBUCH EUROPARECHT 2018 (Günter Herzig ed., 2019, forthcoming). 
2  Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L95/29. 
3  This refers to a vast body of CJEU case law, under which a national court is required to examine, of its own motion, 
the unfairness of a contractual term where it has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that 
task. See, e.g., CJEU, Case C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt. v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi ECLI:EU:C:2009:350; Case C-40/08 
Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira ECLI:EU:C:2009:615; Case C-137/08 VB Pénzügyi 
Lízing Zrt v Ferenc Schneider ECLI:EU:C:2010:659; Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón 
Camino ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, and many others. For the application of this principle in (various types of) 
enforcement proceedings, see, e.g., CJEU, Case C-76/10 Pohotovosť s. r. o. v Iveta Korčkovská ECLI:EU:C:2010:685; 
Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa) 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:164; Case C-470/12 Pohotovosť s.r.o. v Miroslav Vašuta ECLI:EU:C:2014:101; Case C-32/14 ERSTE 
Bank Hungary Zrt. v Attila Sugár ECLI:EU:C:2015:637; Case C-49/14 Finanmadrid EFC SA v Jesús Vicente Albán 
Zambrano et al ECLI:EU:C:2016:98. An extensive discussion of this line of case law has recently been provided by 
ANTHI BEKA, THE ACTIVE ROLE OF COURTS IN CONSUMER LITIGATION – APPLYING EU LAW OF THE NATIONAL COURTS’ OWN MOTION 
(2018); see also Kalev Saare and Karin Sein, Amtsermittlungspflicht der nationalen Gerichte bei der Kontrolle von 
missbräuchlichen Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen, 2 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN CONSUMER AND MARKET LAW 15 (2013). 
4  See questions 1 and 3 as stated in CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 27 and reformulated by the Court 
in para. 32. 
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auction.5 As the consumer did not repay her debt, the bank initiated such an extra-judicial 
enforcement procedure before a notary, in which the bank itself was awarded the mortgaged 
property for about 60% of the assessed value stated in the contract. The consumer therefore 
continued to owe about € 13,500. For transferring the ownership of the mortgaged apartment to 
the bank, the notary drew up an instrument of sale. Without any involvement of the consumer, the 
bank signed as the consumer’s representative as seller. The bank also signed on its own behalf as 
buyer. This was in accordance with the representation clause in the mortgage contract. Thereupon, 
the bank was registered as the apartment’s new owner in the land register. In the following 
procedure before the Spanish court, the bank sought an order, based on its right of ownership, for 
surrender of the apartment and the ejection of the consumer from the dwelling.6 The Spanish 
court turned to the CJEU.  
The CJEU replied by first recapitulating general case law principles concerning the protection 
regime established by the UCTD. In particular, the CJEU noted that where a mortgage is enforced 
before a notary, the consumer must have a right, even at the enforcement stage, to challenge 
allegedly unfair contract clauses before a court.7 Then, as one of the main aspects in its 
argumentation, the CJEU emphasised that a distinction must be drawn between the procedure 
enforcing the mortgage on the one hand and the present procedure before the referring court on 
the other, in which the bank sought to enforce its newly-acquired right of ownership.8 The CJEU did 
observe that in the case at hand, the apartment owner (bank) is the same person as the mortgage 
creditor. However, the Court continued, any interested third party could have acquired the 
ownership in the course of the extra-judicial enforcement of the mortgage and could, as a result, 
have an interest in bringing proceedings for vacating the apartment. In such circumstances, “to 
allow the debtor who has granted a mortgage over that property to set up defences founded on 
the mortgage loan agreement against the transferee of that property, an agreement to which that 
transferee may nevertheless be a third party, would be liable to affect legal certainty in pre-existing 
proprietary relationships”.9 The CJEU found it decisive that the basis for the bank’s claim before the 
referring court is its ownership right in the apartment, and not the mortgage contract: (only) in the 
latter case, the law had required an effective review of the potential unfairness of contractual terms 
even at the enforcement stage. Therefore, the Court held that the consumer, in the present case, 
                                                                
5  See CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 20. 
6  According to Article 250(1) no. 7 of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure, the court shall rule claims, under a 
simplified procedure, “brought by the holders of real rights entered in the land register, for the enforcement of 
those rights against those who challenge or interfere in their exercise without any registered title justifying the 
challenge or interference”. See CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 7. 
7  See CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 38, referring to CJEU, Case C-32/14 ERSTE Bank Hungary para. 59. 
For an analysis of the latter judgement, see Wolfgang Faber and Eva Klampferer, Zivilrecht und Internationales 
Privatrecht, Schwerpunkt Verbraucherschutz, in JAHRBUCH EUROPARECHT 2016 281, 303 ff. (Günter Herzig ed., 2016). 
See also Andreas Piekenbrock, Vollstreckungsunterwerfung und unionsrechtliche Klauselkontrolle, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR DAS PRIVATRECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION 137 (2016), who, however, does not sufficiently address that the CJEU, 
in ERSTE Bank Hungary, in fact requires a possibility of judicial review in addition to the allegedly neutral role a 
notary plays in a private enforcement procedure. 
8  CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 40–44. 
9  CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 45. 
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cannot rely on the provisions of the UCTD in order to prevent “the recognition and protection of 
the owner’s real rights over that property”.10 
B. Our Aims and How the Banco Santander Case Will Serve Them 
We argue that this kind of conceptual legal reasoning – the bank acquires ownership, which has 
effect against everyone, therefore it must be invulnerable against consumer contract law rules for 
the sake of legal certainty – is too formal an approach and actually distracts from the real problems 
at hand. As legal researchers our aim in this article is not to show that the CJEU has rendered a 
wrong decision. There are additional facts and procedural implications (see section I.C. below) that 
may shed a different light on the overall result. Our concern is a methodological one, and we will 
use those facts of the Banco Santander case that have been stated above in order to show that it 
would be possible to achieve more balanced solutions by employing an alternative methodological 
approach. 
In the subsequent chapters, we will therefore introduce a so-called ‘functional approach’, which 
has been applied for decades in the property law systems of the Nordic European countries and 
in the United States. This will be done in a general way first and then be turned into a step-by-step 
instruction of how to apply such an approach to an individual case (chapter II.). We will then return 
to the Banco Santander case and try to demonstrate how this case – or rather the parts of the facts 
that we have identified as being relevant for our purposes stated above – can be analysed by 
applying this ‘functional approach’ step by step (chapter III.). By doing this, we hope that the 
potential benefits of making use of such an approach, not only in its original environment of 
property law but in particular when (national) property law clashes with EU consumer protection 
rules, which require to be applied effectively, will become apparent. This leads us to assert that 
applying a ‘functional approach’ actually offers an appropriate framework for determining how far 
this ‘principle of effectiveness’ arising from EU consumer contract law directives should reach in a 
particular case or, in other words, where to delimit its scope. Chapter IV., finally, carries the 
discussion one step further by drawing up the hypothesis that the EU law principle of effectiveness 
may actually require applying an approach that, at least, comes fairly close to the ‘functional 
approach’ we have by then presented and applied. This may provide an opportunity of actually 
sharpening the way of applying the principle of effectiveness itself to a certain extent. Chapter V. 
will add a few conclusive remarks. 
C. Further Aspects of the Case, and What We Do Not Aim at 
As mentioned above, we do not make use of the full set of facts and of all arguments presented in 
the CJEU judgement C-598/15 Banco Santander. In other words, we make use of a slightly adapted 
version of this case in order to make the – primarily methodological – points previously mentioned. 
In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, we will now clarify which aspects of the case we will 
not consider. 
(i) In particular, we will not touch upon the CJEU’s argument that, in contrast to the referring court’s 
submissions, the consumer apparently did have opportunities to defend herself, on the ground 
                                                                
10  CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 46 f. (quote from para. 47). 
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that the mortgage contract contained unfair terms, within the course of the mortgage enforcement 
procedure.11 Whether this was the case or not is something we simply cannot assess. We therefore 
design ‘our version’ of the Banco Santander case as if the issue of complete consumer passivity did 
not arise,12 and we will not get further into a discussion whether this argument has been raised 
rightly or not.13 The reason is that this aspect is not directly relevant for the property law 
implications of the case, which are our primary concern. 
Another simplification is that we will not deal with the fact that the consumer in the case was 
helped by a fund to stay in the apartment as a tenant for some time between the completion of 
the enforcement procedure and the bank’s current claim for ejection.14 This, too, is not directly 
relevant to the property law implications of the case, although this fact may theoretically offer a 
reason why the consumer had little incentive to make a claim, at an earlier stage, that the contract 
was unfair. In Advocate General (AG) Wahl’s opinion, the aspect of this social tenancy agreement 
is, however, rather employed as an argument for not recommending an ex officio intervention.15 
(ii) Also the way we deal with Spanish procedural law in this article requires some clarification: in 
general, we try to refer to Spanish procedural law in the same way as the CJEU and the Advocate 
General do it in their reasoning. This primarily means that the specific proceeding before the 
referring Spanish court serves the purpose of “safeguard[ing] the protection of real rights entered 
in the land register, irrespective of the means by which they were acquired”.16 
This, as such, is a correct description, but at the same time tells only half of the truth: Under the 
applicable Spanish rules of civil procedure, the procedure initiated by the bank to vacate the 
apartment17 is a ‘summary’ procedure. This means that, first, the defendant’s defences are limited 
to certain grounds entailed in an exhaustive list.18 This list does not include a defence based on the 
invalidity of a contract term of the mortgage agreement, or the invalidity of the whole mortgage 
agreement, which formed the basis of the claimant’s acquisition of ownership. However, the 
Spanish system of transferring ownership of both movable and immovable property is a ‘causal’ 
transfer system. This means that the transfer, including a transfer through a forced sale in an extra-
judicial enforcement procedure, must be based on a valid underlying obligation to transfer (arising, 
                                                                
11  See CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 49, referring to AG Nils Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco 
SantanderSA v Cristobalina Sánchez López ECLI:EU:C:2017:505, para. 70. 
12  The issue of consumer passivity has been dealt with, with somewhat different outcomes, in CJEU, Case C-40/08 
Asturcom paras. 33 ff. (national court’s duty to conduct ex officio review affirmed) and Case C-32/14 ERSTE Bank 
Hungary paras. 62 f. (principle of effectiveness held not to require counterbalancing complete passivity of the 
consumer). 
13  There may be certain doubts arising from the principle of effectiveness because according to Article 444(2) of the 
Spanish Code of Civil Procedure, the defendant (here: the consumer) must, if the applicant (bank) so requests, pay 
a deposit fixed by the court before the defendant can challenge a claim brought under the specific procedure used 
for vacating the apartment (see CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 8). The deposit to be paid in the 
present case was apparently € 10,000 (ibid., para. 24). Where a claim for vacating her apartment has been brought 
precisely because the consumer could not any longer pay her dues, it is rather likely that she cannot raise the 
money for paying a deposit either. 
14  See AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 79. 
15  See AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 79–81. 
16  CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 42; cf. also para. 44. 
17  The procedure is governed by Article 250(1) no. 7 of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure. 
18  As provided by Article 444(2) of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure; cf. CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander 
paras. 7 f. 
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e.g., from a contract for sale).19 Second, in this context, the ‘summary’ character of the procedure 
at hand means that the decision is not final; the judgement does not have the authority of res 
iudicata.20 The summary character of the procedure reflects the rebuttable presumption that a 
property right in an immovable object exists and belongs to the person registered as its title-holder 
in the land register.21 Therefore, the defendant may be forced to vacate the property under a 
judgement rendered in this summary procedure. But there still is a possibility to afterwards 
challenge the validity of the registered title-holder’s acquisition of ownership in a ‘plenary’ 
procedure. A final decision on property issues can only be obtained in that latter type of procedure. 
If the registered title-holder’s right of ownership is ruled to be invalid in that subsequent trial, this 
person will be deemed to never having been the rightful owner. 
This second type of procedure, which alone decides on the validity of the acquisition, is not 
mentioned in CJEU’s judgement; perhaps it has not been addressed in the referring court’s 
application for the preliminary ruling. In any case, the CJEU does not deal with the question 
whether it would be in line with the UCTD’s principle of effectiveness if the consumer had to leave 
the apartment in the first place but still had the chance to get it back in such a ‘plenary’ procedure. 
We will not deal with this question either, and base our article on the same simplification as 
appears to the readers of the CJEU case. This is not a problem in the light of our primarily 
methodological goals. But it should be noted that we, therefore, cannot (and do not) claim to 
present ‘the right solution’ for Spanish law. 
The procedural clarifications made above are also important in another context. They should help 
to avoid drawing overly strict conclusions from the CJEU’s reasoning for other European legal 
systems. The Court’s argumentation has been developed against the background of what the Court 
understood to be Spanish (substantive and procedural) law,22 and this involves the assumption 
that the law of civil procedure does not provide any chance to raise a defence based on the 
invalidity of the acquisition. Many other European laws do not have such provisions, and it is 
therefore not excluded that the CJEU might come to a different conclusion if the same set of facts 
were arising in another Member State. The Court, in an almost hidden move at the very end of its 
reasoning, seems to recognise this: It states that the judgement’s result, i.e., that Articles 6 and 7 
UCTD are not applicable to proceedings such as those before the referring Spanish court, shall 
apply “provided that … the proceedings are independent of the legal relationship between the 
creditor and the consumer”.23 
                                                                
19  See Isabel González Pacanowska and Carlos Manuel Díez Soto, National Report on the Transfer of Movables in 
Spain, in NATIONAL REPORTS ON THE TRANSFER OF MOVABLES IN EUROPE, VOLUME 5 393, 537 ff. (Wolfgang Faber and Brigitta 
Lurger eds., 2011). We are grateful to these authors for having provided us with additional information on Spanish 
civil procedure law, which is reflected in this paragraph. 
20  Article 447(3) of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure. 
21  See Article 38 of the Spanish Act on Hypothecs. 
22  For the importance of considering the facts of the referred case when interpreting the CJEU’s judgement, see 
Wolfgang Faber, Auslegung von EuGH-Entscheidungen – Eine Annäherung anhand von Beispielen aus dem 
Verbraucherprivatrecht, 139 JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER 697 (part 1) and 776 (part 2), at 707–709 (2017). This should 
arguably include national law in relation to which the CJEU develops its argumentation. 
23  CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 50 and in the final answer (italics have been added by the authors). 
Note that the “provided that” formula is equally present in the French version (i.e., the original version) and in the 
Spanish version (the official language of the case before the CJEU) of the judgement, but has been translated falsely 
in the German version (using “because” – “da” in German – instead of “provided that”). 
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(iii) Finally, it should be clarified that we will, in the subsequent chapters, promote the ‘functional 
approach’ for the purposes of the present article; that is, reconciling national property law rules 
with the UCTD’s (or any other EU directive’s) principle of effectiveness. It is not the aim of this article 
to require national property law regimes to change towards a ‘functional approach’. For the 
purposes discussed in this article, a ‘functional approach’ can be applied in relation to any national 
property law regime. 
The following will focus on the role property law concepts shall play, or shall not play, when 
determining the operating distance of the principle of effectiveness in EU consumer contract law. 
II. A Functional Approach 
There are many ways of understanding how property law concepts affect our modes of thinking. 
This is a topic in several academic fields, including philosophy, anthropology, economics and law.24 
The way we perceive our relationships and resources is to a large extent affected by the (various) 
concepts of ownership and the structures built around this concept. In this article we will approach 
the concept of ownership with what has been labelled the ‘functional approach’.25 We do so 
because we think that this functional approach can not only be applied to property law matters as 
such (the legal environment where much of this approach has been developed and applied) but 
also where issues of (national) property law clash with norms of EU law. Specifically, we consider it 
applicable where property law issues clash with the UCTD’s demand for an effective review of 
potentially unfair terms in consumer contracts. The functional approach has been built around the 
conception that concepts in and of themselves should only to a limited extent influence the 
understanding of a legal issue.26 Rather, the specific conflicts between different parties involved 
should be dealt with on their own merits, and concepts thereby assume the role of mere tools for 
communication. Hence we think that the functional approach can help to reveal instances in which 
the inconsiderate use of the ownership concept can affect legal thinking in ways that are potentially 
questionable from an EU law perspective.  
                                                                
24  See among numerous titles the anthologies PROPERTY RELATIONS: RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION (Chris M. 
Hann ed., 1998); MICHELE GRAZIADEI AND LIONEL SMITH, COMPARATIVE PROPERTY LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (2017). Also, to 
just mention some of the classical works on property: JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (first published 
1689, reprint 1947); GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. M. Knox tr., 2008).  
25  For the term ‘functional approach’ see, in the English language, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and 
the Functional Approach, 35 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 809 (1935); MARTIN LILJA, TRANSFER OF MOVABLE PROPERTY UNDER U.S. 
LAW DISCUSSED FROM A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2014); Claes Martinson, The Scandinavian Approach to Property Law, 
Described through Six Common Legal Concepts, 22 JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 16 (2014); Claes Martinson, How Swedish 
Lawyers Think about ‘Ownership’ and ‘Transfer of Ownership’, in RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF MOVABLES 69 (Wolfgang 
Faber and Birgitta Lurger eds., 2008); Wolfgang Faber, Scepticism about the Functional Approach from a Unitary 
Perspective, in RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF MOVABLES 97 (Wolfgang Faber and Birgitta Lurger eds., 2008). In the Nordic 
legal discussion the word ‘pragmatism’ has also been used; see SVERRE BLANDHOL, NORDISK RETTSPRAGMATISME: SAVIGNY, 
ØRSTED OG SCHWEIGAARD OM VITENSKAP OG METODE (2005). Perhaps the approach should rather be described as the 
‘functionalistic approach’ since this emphasises that it is a matter of describing a style of legal thinking, rather than 
describing that this way of thinking is actually more functional or better-working than other styles of legal thinking. 
26  As the reader may notice, we have here turned to call it “the” functional approach, although in the headings of this 
section we prefer “a” functional approach. We do this since our ambition is not to promote a certain approach to 
legal thinking because of its background, or because we think specific functional thoughts should be used in a 
specific manner. Rather, what we would like to show is how legal thinking can be developed in a direction inspired 
by functional thoughts, with a skepticism towards too much emphasis on conceptual thinking. 
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What we will explain in this chapter is, first, why functionalist approaches developed in Scandinavia 
and in the United States (section II.A.). This is not a historical exposé, but rather an explanation to 
how the aims of the functionalists are understood today. Against this background we will present 
a short step-by-step instruction of how the functionalist approach can be used when dealing with 
property law issues in general, or when property law and EU consumer law need to be considered 
in a particular case (II.B.). The fact that we use functional ideas is not an attempt to promote the 
functional approach as superior than any other approach to legal thinking.27 Nevertheless, it can 
be used both for reflection and as a technical tool when trying to reconcile property law principles 
and EU consumer law. 
A. Why a Functional Approach? 
The development of a specific kind of legal thinking is of course a complex phenomenon to 
describe, even more so when this development concerns two different cultures. It is clear that both 
US and Scandinavian jurisprudence were influenced by the movement of legal realism in the early 
twentieth century. The legal realisms of the two cultures are, however, different.28 At the same 
time legal realism does not fully explain why the functional approaches developed in any of these 
legal cultures.  
We do not need to go into historical details here. What we want to explain is how, as to substance, 
functional ideas approach the concept of ownership and how they manage to deal with the same 
problems without focusing on such a concept:29 One central idea of legal functionalism is that the 
ownership concept is not fit for connecting different kinds of issues to each other. Different 
relationships and their different legal issues should be kept apart. The different issues should be 
dealt with on their own merits. The concept of ownership should not be used to connect them. 
This can be illustrated by the following quote (describing pre-UCC American sales law):  
“Unless a cogent reason be shown to the contrary, the location of title will govern every point which it can 
be made to govern. It will govern, between the parties, risk, action for the price, the applicable law in an 
interstate transaction, the place and time for measuring damages, the power to defeat the other party’s 
interest, or to replevy, or to reject; it will govern, as against outsiders, leviability, rights against tort-
feasors, infraction of criminal statutes about sales, incidence of taxation, power to insure. The burden is 
put upon any individual issue to show why it should be honored by being severed from the Title-lump in 
any particular, and given individualized treatment. Now this would be an admirable way to go at it if the 
Title concept (or other basic integrated concept used) had been tailored to fit the normal course of a 
going or suspended situation during its flux or suspension. But Title was not thus conceived, nor has its 
                                                                
27  Also, the functionalist approaches have, so far, not been developed to the extent they could have; see, for instance, 
ERLEND BALDERSHEIM, TIL TINGSRETTENS TEORI (2017); Claes Martinson, Något om behoven av att underhålla och 
utveckla den nordiska (funktionalistiska) rättstraditionen – Segelbåtsfallet, in FESTSKRIFT TILL GÖRAN MILLQVIST 461 
(Lars Gorton, Lars Heuman, Annina H. Persson and Gustaf Sjöberg eds., 2019). Compare also Michael G. Bridge, 
Roderick A. MacDonald, Ralph L. Simmonds and Catherine Walsh, Formalism, Functionalism, and Understanding 
the Law of Secured Transactions, 44 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL 567 (1999). 
28  See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Comparing the Two Legal Realisms – American and Scandinavian, 50 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 131 (2002).  
29  For a description of general characteristics of legal functionalism see, e.g., BLANDHOL, supra note 25, at 51–72. With 
regard to the concept of ownership, see also Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 Harvard Law Review 812 (1956–1957). 
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environment of buyers and sellers had material effect upon it. It remains, in the sales field, an alien lump, 
undigested. It even interferes with the digestive process.”30 
The quote, at least, illustrates the view that the concept of ownership should not be used for solving 
a great variety of legal issues involving different interests and different parties, in particular in 
transfer situations. When the rules for the transfer of ownership were designed, they were usually 
not tailored to perfectly solve all the issues that can possibly be linked to them. The quote, 
however, can also be read in the sense that the concept of ownership should not be used for 
deducing legal consequences at all. Considering both interpretations of the text above, another 
tool must be used for construing legal solutions. This tool – the ‘real issue’ – is addressed in the 
subsequent paragraph. But first we would like to reiterate that what we have previously stated 
does not, from a functionalist point of view, mean the term ‘ownership’ should necessarily be 
avoided or has no meaning whatsoever.31 The functionalist approach simply entails that the 
concept of ownership is a relational and relative concept. If a legal solution to one legal conflict 
means that one party wins against the other, this could be described through the winner having 
or getting ‘title’, or them being awarded ‘ownership’. However, it is important to note that this use 
of the concept means nothing more than the winner having priority over the other party. It does 
not mean that the winner gains a better position against any other possible party who claims 
priority on another legal ground.32 
Instead of linking the solution of a conflict to the question of who has ownership, the idea is to deal 
with each issue on its own merits.33 To do so, it becomes necessary to identify what the real 
problem of the case is. Functionalist lawyers often do this without much reflection and without 
specifically labeling the process, but when explaining this part to lawyers from other legal 
traditions, the term identifying the ‘real issue’ can be used.34 The real issue, or the real problem, 
can be defined by identifying the typical interests that two parties typically have in the type of 
conflict at hand. This can be viewed as another side of the idea not to involve the ownership 
concept in the problem-solving as such: By identifying the typical clash of interests in the type of 
situation at hand, concepts are not used to define the issue. They become mere tools for 
communication and are understood in relation to the real issue. To illustrate what this means we 
will use two examples: 
Example 1: A seller (A) sold his car to a buyer under the condition that the car should “fall back to” the 
seller if the buyer did not pay the remaining price in time. The buyer (B) did not pay, but he sold the car 
to another buyer (C). Since the first seller (A) then understood the risk that the first buyer (B) would not 
pay, he sued the second buyer (C) to get the car back.  
                                                                
30  Karl Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 New York University Law Quarterly Review 159, 169 
(1938). 
31  To avoid any possible misunderstanding: ‘ownership’ (or ‘title’) does remain an important concept in the legal 
thinking in both the United States and in the Nordic countries.  
32  See, e.g., HENRIK HESSLER, ALLMÄN SAKRÄTT 18 (1973). Compare David Frisch, Remedies as Property: A Different 
Perspective on Specific Performance Clauses, 35 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW 1691 (1994). 
33  See, for instance, Torgny Håstad, Derivative Acquisition of Ownership of Goods, 17 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF PRIVATE LAW 
725 (2009). 
34  See, e.g., Martinson, 22 JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 16, supra note 25. 
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In a case like this the real issue is the first seller (A) typically not wanting the car back. He wants to 
get paid. The second buyer (C) does, however, want to keep the car. Of course, C will prefer keeping 
the car without paying a second time, but even if this should turn out to be impossible – and if the 
claim that A has against B is smaller than the value of the car – C would prefer to pay A that amount, 
rather than handing over the car to A.35 The real issue is, therefore, whether A’s interest to get paid 
or C’s interest to keep the car without paying should be given priority? Hence, the matter to decide 
is whether C should pay A what A has contracted for or whether C can keep the car without paying. 
(The party who loses can of course claim the loss from B, but there is typically a substantial risk 
that B will never be able to pay his debts.)  
If we place this issue in the Swedish jurisdiction it would be solved by using the Swedish legislation 
on good faith acquisition. Due to the wording of the legislation, the easily available public Swedish 
car register and Swedish case law, the requirements for good faith are rather high. It is particularly 
hard to be in good faith when buying a car from a seller (B) who himself bought the car under a 
contract clause that gave the seller’s seller (A) the right to terminate the contract if the car was not 
paid. The information concerning these contract clauses is available through the public vehicle 
register. Therefore, C would most probably be regarded to be in bad faith. Because of C’s bad faith, 
the issue would probably be solved by obligating C to pay A the remaining price of what B should 
have paid, as well as giving A the right to take the car back if C does not pay.  
The solution described is not in itself remarkable. What we would like to point out is that the 
concept of ownership is not at all used when dealing with the issue. Instead, the question of law to 
decide concerns only the real problem, or real issue. The real issue is the conflict of interests that 
typical parties like A and C have in such situations. With a functional approach lawyers do not care 
about who owns the car. Ownership is not important for creating a solution to the ‘real problem’.36 
Example 2: Another example concerns the situation where a debtor (D) is not able to fulfil his obligations 
because of insolvency. When insolvency occurs, D has sold, but not yet delivered, goods to a buyer (B). 
This situation can be understood as a matter of ownership: What the debtor does not own should 
not be drawn into his bankruptcy estate because the property of others should be handed over to 
them. Hence, the issue can be perceived as a question of whether the buyer had become the owner 
before the seller went bankrupt. From a functional perspective this is, however, not the way to 
think.37 With a functional approach this case is not seen as an issue of ownership. One does not 
                                                                
35  This is because C’s overall loss will be smaller in that case. 
36  This does not mean that lawyers who use the functional approach could not say that A won ownership if he wins 
the case. Actually the Swedish legislation, somewhat surprisingly, uses the word ‘ownership’ to describe the claim 
that A has and what A or C wins if they win. Since the word ‘ownership’ is understood relationally and relatively, 
the term is, however, only used to express priority in the particular type of relation. This can be illustrated by the 
fact that the circumstances of the Swedish Supreme Court decision NJA (Nytt juridiskt arkiv) 1975 p. 222 were the 
same as the circumstances in the example we have given. The case was probably accepted by the Supreme Court 
because the judges wanted to make a precedent concerning terminology. They wanted to decide how clear a 
contract must be concerning the seller’s right of termination, and they decided that other words than ‘ownership’ 
were fully acceptable. The seller had written, in Swedish, that “the car shall fall back to me if payment is not made 
in time”. For this particular case, see also Martinson, in RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF MOVABLES, supra note 25, at 82–
84. 
37  See, e.g., Torgny Håstad, Äganderättens övergång i en gemensam europeisk rättsordning, (2009) TIDSKRIFT UTGIVEN 
AV JURIDISKA FÖRENINGEN I FINLAND 327. Claes Martinson, Ejendomsrettens overgang – Norden kontra verden, in 
FÖRHANDLINGARNA VID DET 39:E NORDISKA JURISTMÖTET I STOCKHOLM 18–19 AUGUSTI 2011 821 (Kavita Bäck Mirchandani 
and Kristina Ståhl eds., 2012). 
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connect this conflict with other conflicts where the concept of ownership could be used. The 
insolvency conflict concerning the item that the buyer bought should be dealt with on its own 
merits. With a functional approach the category of problems like this is seen as an issue of priority. 
This category of problems, or category of conflicts, is called ‘the buyer’s protection from the seller’s 
general creditors’, and ownership is (ideally) not a part of how the problem is perceived.  
The real problem, a functionalist would think, is the conflict of interests between the seller’s 
creditors and the buyer. What the creditors want is to use the property in question to get a higher 
dividend in the bankruptcy proceedings. The buyer is one kind of creditor, and the difference is 
simply the buyer wanting the property as such. Since both sides cannot have what they want, the 
issue of priority must become a question of whether there are reasons for giving priority to a buyer 
at some point in time during a sales relationship. When contemplating this issue, a thorough 
functionalist effort would be to identify that the buyers who have not yet paid any part of the price 
seldom suffer from not being given priority. In those cases, the other creditors normally prefer the 
bankruptcy estate to proceed with the sales contract. Since the creditors want the estate to sell all 
property of the debtor, it is very practical to already have a buyer who is obliged to fulfil an existing 
contract and pay the agreed price. The real problem can therefore be narrowed down to an issue 
of priority for buyers who paid something in advance.38 There is a similarity between those buyers 
and the seller’s general creditors in that they all trusted the seller by giving him or her credit. The 
real problem can thus be formulated as whether a creditor, who is a buyer and therefore has a 
main claim for the delivery of specific goods and alternatively a claim to get compensation for an 
unfulfilled contract, should be given priority over the other creditors of the seller.39 
Since the functional approach is a way of thinking, the real issue needs to be dealt with by the 
legislator, as well as by practicing lawyers in every-day legal practice. When there are established 
rules that fit the case at hand, the process can be narrowed down by using the legal template for 
the specific type of problem. When it comes to a case where an unclear issue of law appears, the 
application of the functional approach includes a constructive problem solving method, as we will 
explain in the following chapter. 
B. How a Functional Approach Can be Applied 
The previous section tried to explain fundamental features of the functional approach and 
illustrated this way of legal reasoning by means of two examples from the original ambit of this 
                                                                
38  And, also, to buyers who were lucky to enter into the contract at a time when the market prices for the property 
in question were lower than the prices are at the time of bankruptcy. We simplify and leave these cases out. We 
also do not deal with ‘actio Pauliana’ issues where the buyer got a low price and the contract therefore should be 
questioned by insolvency legislation. 
39  We should point out that we describe a rather developed functional view on this issue here. If we look at what has 
been argued in, for example, Swedish legal argumentation, the issue has not been perceived like this. See our 
criticism of a particular underdeveloped view in Jens Andreasson, Wolfgang Faber, Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, 
Claes Martinson and Stefan Sjögren, Prioritet för köpare – en fråga om tradition eller princip?, 100 SVENSK 
JURISTTIDNING 709 (2015). For a policy-oriented debate of this issue see also Comments C(c) to Article VIII.–2:101 
DCFR, in PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW – DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), 
FULL EDITION, VOLUME V 4396–4404 (Christian von Bar and Eric Clive eds., 2009). Compare also Håstad, supra note 
33, at 735–736, who assumes that every buyer and seller would always agree to give the buyer priority. 
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approach, ie, (national) property law. In the present section, we will prepare for moving a step 
further. As outlined above, we believe that the functional approach can also provide an appropriate 
methodological framework for dealing with cases where national property law is confronted with 
potentially opposing norms of EU consumer contract law. In order to demonstrate this – while at 
the same time making the approach a useful tool for everyone – in this section we will describe 
how the functional approach can be used, by providing a kind of step-by-step instruction. Since 
there is not one ‘official’ functional approach upon which lawyers have agreed in terms of a general 
working method, the steps we suggest here are our own creation. We do, however, believe from 
our experience that these steps, or at least a similar description of the working process, would in 
essence meet with consensus among functionalist lawyers.40 
Step 1: Keep the relations between different parties apart and decide which relation should be dealt with 
first, without classifying them as a specific concept-linked type of legal relationship.  
With a functional approach, the relations between different parties should be kept apart from each 
other. By dealing with each relation on its own it is easier to identify whether, and to what extent, 
there is a conflict between the parties of a specific relationship. This also helps – at later steps 
within the problem-solving process – to focus exclusively on aspects that are relevant for the 
specific relation at hand. We suggest not only to keep different party relations apart, but also to 
avoid immediately classifying these single party relations in terms of specific dogmatic concepts. 
Such a categorisation, for instance as a matter of sale, proprietary security, or tort, may of course 
be important for legal understanding, analysis and problem-solving, but the closer classification 
can take place at a later step. The point is that by keeping the classification open for the time being, 
preconceptions that easily follow from such classifications are kept at bay. Concepts connected to 
such a classification do not exert a decisive influence over the perception of the issue. Concepts 
should not influence more of the process than what has been thought through. 
Step 2: Identify the ‘real problem’ in the relation.  
After deciding what relation to deal with, the second step is to analyse what the conflict consists 
of. The conflict, first, always relates to a specific set of facts, i.e., the situation in which the parties 
are placed when the legal problem needs to be solved. Second, the interests of the parties need to 
be made clear. This involves the result a party wants to achieve and why this is the case. Third, it is 
important to pinpoint to what extent the different interests collide. The ‘real problem’ is this 
collision of interests. Again, to identify this real problem, the lawyer needs to think beyond the legal 
concepts that are regularly used to communicate. If concepts such as ‘ownership’ should happen 
to occur in the communication, they should be seen as relational and relative in terms of priority 
over the other party. This functionalistic scepticism towards legal concepts is, once again, useful to 
avoid the concepts influencing the analysis. It is the conflict of interests that needs to be dealt with. 
By not using a starting point where one party’s position is defined by a legal concept such as ‘the 
owner’, it is easier to understand what the real problem is, and it is easier to solve without giving 
one party a preconceptual advantage.  
Step 3: Identify everything that is relevant to construct a solution, and make arguments out of all relevant 
aspects.  
                                                                
40  Compare the ambition in Martinson, in RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF MOVABLES, supra note 25. 
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When the real problem has been defined, the next step of the functional approach is to identify 
everything that seems relevant to deal with the problem. In this step it is useful to be open to 
perspectives, ideas and reflections concerning the real problem. Norms of different kinds should 
be noted. There are different kinds of normative propositions that may be relevant: Acts of 
legislation are one kind of dictum with a normative value, and so are, of course, judges’ decisions. 
Another type of aspect that is potentially relevant for constructing a solution are assumptions 
about facts. Such assumptions are often used by lawyers, more or less consciously.41 These 
assumptions need to be noted when making functionalistic reflections. One particular category 
worth highlighting is the assumptions on the consequences of the different solutions that are 
contemplated. Further, different kinds of values can prove relevant for developing a solution. Legal 
foreseeability, protection of a weak party, freedom of contract, etc, are values that lawyers usually 
contemplate when dealing with a specific conflict of interests. Everything that is considered 
relevant should be turned into arguments in this third step. By doing so, the lawyer has a collection 
of arguments to use when taking the fourth step.42  
When using this third step in the EU law context, it may turn out that some aspects and arguments, 
such as the assumptions mentioned above, are considered to be more relevant in one Member 
State than in others. This should, however, not be a problem in the identification procedure of the 
third step.  
What we describe here might seem to be a very complex procedure. However, it does not need to 
be complex. The complexity depends on the real problem at hand. If it is a so called clear question 
of law, there is little need to collect different arguments. However, where the real problem 
concerns the application of EU law in a national jurisdiction – and includes national legal thinking 
and national legal concepts that affect the interpretation of EU law43 – the real problem is typically 
                                                                
41  Such assumptions include, on a general level: assumptions on facts that are considered to form a ‘typical case’ 
(what does usually happen within a specific setting?); assumptions as to (typical or individual) interests and 
preferences of the parties; assumptions on how parties react to a course of events or a rule of law. On a more 
concrete level, an example concerning priority in bankruptcy would be assuming that every buyer and seller would 
always agree to give the buyer priority over the seller’s creditors, because this seems like the only rational choice 
from the perspective the particular lawyer takes (compare the assumption made by Håstad reflected in note 39). 
Another concrete assumption is that anti-assignment clauses are harmful to society. That assumption is then 
combined with the assumption that freedom of contract is not efficient when it comes to anti-assignment clauses. 
To give some more general examples: lawyers often make assumptions on risks and frequency. These 
assumptions are very common since they are necessary to understand the relevance and significance of a case, 
both where it has already been decided or where it still needs to be decided. The ‘floodgate’ argument is a specific 
variation of a risk assumption. Another specific risk assumption concerns the possibilities of circumventing a rule, 
something that lawyers tend to overestimate (which is an assumption that we make, in turn). Also, a very common 
category of assumptions concerns transactions costs; although lawyers might perceive such costs as something 
else and describe them in other terms (such as: a solution or rule that is ‘troublesome’, ‘unpractical’, ‘formalistic’, 
etc). Some of the assumptions that lawyers make are recounted between lawyers for the purpose of making 
lawyers understand how a rule or a norm can be legitimised. This can create what has been described as the 
‘lawyers-created reality’, see HANS-PETTER GRAVER, DEN JURISTSKAPTE VIRKELIGHET (1986).  
42  Which norms, facts and values are used by lawyers as arguments is of course a comprehensive issue. What we 
describe here could be developed further to a large extent, including various views on what lawyers do, and on 
the closely related topic of what law is. For one explanation, see CLAES MARTINSON, KREDITSÄKERHET I 
FAKTURAFORDRINGAR 49–105 (2002). See also ‘the fourth step’ below.  
43  Such as in the present Banco Santander case, where the question essentially is how far the need of effectively 
applying EU consumer protection rules goes in relation to specific national rules of property law and civil 
procedure law. 
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an unclear question of law. When dealing with unclear questions of law, it is useful to clarify your 
course of conduct and mode of thinking.  
Step 4: Weigh the different arguments and decide on how to use them by trying to put the decisive and 
most important ones together into an argumentation that justifies a solution. 
After gathering arguments, as in the third step, the lawyer needs to mould them into an 
argumentation. This includes linking those arguments that either support or oppose each other, 
and giving priority to some arguments over others according to their relevance and weight. This 
process takes place in every legal decision-making.44 There is no particular functional approach 
method in this respect. What we need to explain is rather that a functional approach brings the 
opportunity to contemplate all of the arguments gathered in the third step. This opportunity makes 
the process conscious. It also makes it easier to see the role that property law concepts are playing. 
The idea of contemplating all potentially relevant arguments will not be considered strange by 
lawyers who are not used to applying a ‘functional approach’. The ambition should only be that 
this process be a conscious one and that the case should not be decided in a simplistic manner, by 
mainly relying on concepts such as ownership. This, however, does not mean that concepts are 
excluded from the decision-making process altogether. The concepts used in norms need to be 
taken account of in the argumentation, if the norm should have normative effect. When used at 
this stage in the process, the real problem has, however, been allowed to have an important effect 
on how the problem is perceived, and thereby it also affects the understanding of the concept. The 
concept used in the norm is a tool to communicate the typical interest of a typical party and the 
norm needs still to be understood relationally and relatively.  
Finally, there are some general things that can be said about the weighing process that is to be 
conducted at the fourth step. Firstly, the normative propositions such as statutes and precedent 
are of course attributed high normative value. However, when it comes to so called hard or unclear 
questions of law, such as in the Banco Santander case, the norms often do not address the real 
problem in a direct way. The process of ‘interpretation’ of the norms becomes difficult. Secondly, 
to include the other types of arguments, such as assumptions regarding the consequences a legal 
decision concerning the real problem can have, is a common part of the legal decision-making 
process, though a lawyer’s consciousness of doing so may vary considerably. Assumptions like this 
do affect the legal thinking, as well as the understanding of a normative dictum, such as an act of 
parliament. A norm cannot be understood without an idea of what the reality the norm should 
govern looks like. When we, for example, try to learn a rule on the buyer’s priority over the seller’s 
creditors, we do not comprehend it until we understand that these rules (also) govern the risk of 
fraudulent behaviour by the parties. We therefore make assumptions on the level of risk or are 
told about such assumptions that other lawyers have already made. In the same way, a norm 
cannot be understood without values. A common value is that law should treat everyone equally 
and to fully understand a rule on the buyer’s priority over the seller’s creditors, we might need to 
see whether or not the rule can easily be circumvented. 
                                                                
44  It is well known that there are various ways of explaining how legal argumentation is constructed and how legal 
decisions are made. This is a common topic in legal theory. A common simplified explanation is that it is a matter 
of ‘interpreting’ the law. For a classical attempt to explain legal methodology, see, for instance, RUDOLF VON JHERING, 
GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER ENTWICKLUNG, PART II/2 322–445 (1st ed., 1858). 
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The functional approach includes these kinds of arguments, simply because they cannot be 
avoided. Instead of hiding the fact that these arguments have been a part of how the real problem 
was perceived and dealt with by the lawyer in question, the functional approach is (ideally) to reveal 
what role these arguments played. This can of course not be done completely in regard to all the 
arguments, both because time is limited and because it is difficult to fully understand one’s own 
process of thinking. It is, however, useful to make an attempt with the most central arguments. 
With such an ambition, the lawyer will understand the role the thought process and the concepts 
have played better. 
In the following we will illustrate how the perspective offered by the functional approach, and the 
four steps presented as a toolbox, can be used for analysing the CJEU Case C-598/15, Banco 
Santander. 
III. An Analysis of the Case with a Functional Approach 
A. A Closer Review of the Court’s and the Advocate General’s Reasoning 
Before we start analysing Case C-598/15 Banco Santander in terms of a functional approach, some 
central aspects of the CJEU’s reasoning in its judgement should be reviewed more closely. This 
includes a closer examination of the opinion delivered by AG Nils Wahl, because the Court quite 
evidently follows the AG’s analysis in practically all core arguments which have been identified as 
relevant for our article.45 The AG’s argumentation has been abridged and, to some extent, 
rearranged by the judges, and they give a direct reference to the AG’s opinion only with respect to 
one specific argument.46 Nevertheless, in such a case, one can assume with a relatively high degree 
of probability that the CJEU ‘follows’ the AG’s opinion in the sense that the judges in all likelihood 
identify with the more extensive analysis in the AG’s opinion.47 The purpose for highlighting the 
argumentation presented in Banco Santander in a more detailed manner is twofold: It will help to 
carve out aspects we have to refer to in later parts of the article, and to contrast this way of 
reasoning with the functional approach. 
(i) One aspect, highlighted much clearer in the AG’s opinion than in the Court’s judgement, is that 
the core issue of a case like this is to delimitate the ‘operating distance’ of the general EU law 
principle of effectiveness.48 Under this principle, provisions of national law must not “make it in 
practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred on consumers by 
                                                                
45  Cf. above, chapter I. 
46  Compare CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 39–49 to AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco 
Santander paras. 58–84 (for the one aspect where the judgement directly refers to the AG’s opinion, see above, 
section I.C. sub (i) at note 11). 
47  See Faber, supra note 22, at 776; see also Robert Rebhahn, Nach §§ 6, 7 ABGB, in 3. AUFLAGE DES VON DR. HEINRICH 
KLANG BEGRÜNDETEN KOMMENTARS ZUM ALLGEMEINEN BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH – ABGB §§ 1 BIS 43, at n. 123 (Attila 
Fenyves, Ferdinand Kerschner and Andreas Vonkilch eds., 3rd ed., 2014). 
48  See AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 34 ff., 45 ff., 82 and the conclusion drawn in para. 
84. The Court mentions the necessity of providing ‘effective judicial protection’ in CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco 
Santander para. 38, to which the subsequent examination of the procedural particularities of the case at hand 
ultimately relates. 
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European Union law”.49 Such provisions of national law may be those of procedural law, which 
evidently play a prominent role in Case C-598/15 Banco Santander. Given that most procedural 
aspects are not harmonised by EU legislation, they are, in principle, a matter for the national legal 
order of each Member State. However, this principle of procedural autonomy of the Member 
States is limited by the principle of effectiveness as stated above.50 Yet the provisions of national 
law which are subject to the principle of effectiveness can also be provisions of substantive law.51 
We will get back to the implications of this principle of effectiveness further below.52 
(ii) Second, a parallel reading of the AG’s opinion and the CJEU’s judgement shows that much of the 
argumentation focuses on drawing a quite clear distinction: a line is drawn between a scope where 
consumer protection provided by the UCTD applies, and where it does not apply. This is done on 
two different levels. 
On the level of procedural law, the distinction is drawn between two different ‘types of procedures’. 
One type (a) is proceedings brought with regard to the contractual relationship between bank and 
consumer, including, as the case may be, a procedure seeking for payment based on the credit 
contract, and proceedings enforcing the outstanding debt based on the parties’ mortgage 
agreement. In the present case, the latter ultimately lead to the forced sale of the apartment. The 
other type (b) of proceeding is brought ‘to give effect to a property right’; in the present case: to 
force the consumer out of the apartment based on the bank’s right of ownership.53 It is pointed 
out in the argumentation that the whole body of existing CJEU case law on the effectiveness of 
Articles 6(1) and 7 UCTD covers, exclusively, credit obligations and (still) ongoing mortgage 
enforcement proceedings,54 i.e., proceedings of type (a) (which is true but naturally in itself does 
not allow the conclusion that the Directive cannot produce effects in other proceedings as well). 
On this basis, AG Wahl observes that the procedure in the present case is not one of type (a) above, 
“in which it might still be appropriate to give a ruling as to the unfairness of the terms of a mortgage 
loan agreement previously entered into”55 (which appears to imply the premise that within 
proceedings of type (b) it would not any longer be ‘appropriate’ to bother about unfair contract 
terms). Rather, it is submitted by the AG that “the sole object” of proceedings of type (b), as carried 
                                                                
49  See, among many others, CJEU, Case C-415/11 Aziz para. 50; Case C-40/08 Asturcom para. 38. For an in-depth 
analysis of the principle of effectiveness in the case law of the CJEU, see, for instance, KATRIN KULMS, DER 
EFFEKTIVITÄTSGRUNDSATZ in particular at 43 ff. (2013); JULIA KÖNIG, DER ÄQUIVALENZ- UND EFFEKTIVITÄTSGRUNDSATZ IN DER 
RECHTSPRECHUNG DES EUROPÄISCHEN GERICHTSHOFS 43 ff., 105 ff. (2010); see also BEKA, supra note 3, at 31 ff.; Anthony 
Arnull, The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU law: An Unruly Horse?, 36 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 51 (2011). 
50  See the references supra note 49. For a closer analysis of the ‘principle of procedural autonomy of the Member 
States’, including its relationship to the principle of effectiveness, see CHRISTOPH KRÖNKE, DIE VERFAHRENSAUTONOMIE 
DER MITGLIEDSTAATEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION (2013). 
51  This can be illustrated, for instance, by the CJEU’s case law on claims for damages for infringements of Article 101 
TFEU (prohibition of prevention, restriction or distortion of competition), which were, for a long time, governed by 
national substantive law while the principle of effectiveness required certain effects regarding, e.g., limitation 
periods and the extent of the compensation awarded (loss of profit plus interest); cf. CJEU, Joined Cases C-295/04 
to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and others paras. 60 ff., 77 ff., 89 ff. These case 
law principles have later been codified in Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, [2014] OJ L349/1. 
52  The principle of effectiveness will be addressed throughout this article; see, in particular, sections III.C.1., III.D.1. 
and 2. and IV. 
53  See AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 58–68. The Court takes over this dichotomy of 
different types of proceedings in CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 39–44. 
54  AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 43 ff., in particular paras. 54–56. 
55  AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 58. See also ibid., para. 62 and subsequent paras. 
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out in the case at hand, “is to give effect to a property right which has been duly registered”56 
(implying the premise that the registration was in fact a legitimate one, which is, however, not self-
evident given that the acquisition of ownership under Spanish law generally requires a valid ‘title’ 
in the sense of a valid underlying obligation57). This leads AG Wahl to “think it is relatively clear that 
Directive 93/13 cannot be held to be applicable to the procedure at issue [i.e., a procedure type 
(b)], which relates to the verification of rights in rem with a view to the exercise of those rights, and 
not to the performance of a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier”.58 
The Court adopts this procedural distinction in shorter words.59 
On the level of substantive law, a parallel distinction is drawn between (a) the mortgage contract 
between bank and consumer and the security right based on this contract; and (b) the bank’s ‘right 
of ownership’ acquired as a result of the forced sale.60 In a similar pattern, as has been observed 
in the procedural context above, this leads AG Wahl to conclude that, “since the contract 
supposedly containing the term presumed to be unfair … was exhausted by the definitive transfer 
of the immovable property …, it no longer appears relevant to examine the need to prevent or 
suppress the incorporation of such a term”61 (disregarding, again, the possibility that under a 
‘causal’ transfer system any defect in the underlying contract could prevent the transfer from 
taking place62). Further, as the AG puts it, to authorise the court to examine the fairness of terms 
of the mortgage agreement “would involve calling into question … a right in rem”63 which could 
have been acquired by “a completely different entity”.64 Accordingly, in the view of AG Wahl, “it 
would appear to be contrary to the principle of legal certainty and security of property rights to call 
acquired rights of ownership into question, on the basis of effectiveness of Directive 93/13, when 
there is no longer any question of striking out an unfair term in a contract between a seller or 
supplier and a consumer which continues to produce effects.”65 The CJEU follows this assessment 
quite closely.66 
This is a rather formal and concept-oriented way of reasoning: The procedure at hand is of a 
specific category – type (b), not type (a) –, therefore reviewing the potential unfairness of a contract 
term is not ‘appropriate’. The character of the right involved – ownership – is of a specific nature 
                                                                
56  AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 59. 
57  For references regarding the ‘causal’ transfer approach, see supra note 19. With regard to the distinction between 
a ‘summary’ procedure and a final ‘plenary’ procedure in Spanish procedural law, please note the clarifications 
provided in section I.C. sub (ii) above. In the present case, the ‘title’ could be flawed by unfair contract terms or 
violation of general rules of representation. For the latter aspect, see sections III.A. sub (iii) and III.C.2. sub (iii) and 
(iv) below. 
58  AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 68. 
59  Cf. CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 39–44. 
60  This becomes evident from a combined reading of AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 
73–75 and 82–84. See also paras. 58–68 (where the distinction regarding substantive law runs parallel to the 
procedural distinction discussed above). 
61  AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 75. For the view that “the mortgage agreement is 
extinguished, together with the mortgage itself”, upon the conclusion of the enforcement procedure, see also ibid., 
para. 65. 
62  Again, see section I.C. sub (ii) and note 19 above. 
63  AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 82. 
64  AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 83. 
65  AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 84. 
66  CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 45, quoted supra at note 9. 
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(again, type (b)), therefore reopening the issue of unfair terms would undermine legal certainty by 
contesting a ‘right in rem’ involving potential effects on third parties. This way of reasoning certainly 
is open to various kinds of criticism, and some potential aspects have already been mentioned in 
brackets above. The point we would like to make in this article, however, is that certain concepts – 
types of proceedings and types of rights – stand in between the problem and its solution, and it is 
rather the use of these concepts that decides the case than an analysis of the interests of the 
parties involved. It is almost neglected that there are still only two parties involved.67 
(iii) Furthermore, both the AG and the Court point out that, according to their view, there are no 
indications that any terms of the mortgage contract could actually be ‘unfair’ within the meaning 
of the Directive.68 This is quite remarkable, for several reasons. The question of whether a 
particular contract term is actually unfair or not is not an issue for the CJEU to decide in the 
procedure at hand. Another reason is that the CJEU could arguably assume that the Spanish court 
actually had reasons for reviewing the potential unfairness of the contract. It should also be taken 
into account that in other European jurisdictions, already granting authority to the creditor (bank) 
to represent the debtor in private enforcement proceedings before the debt is due, is presumed 
to be void on account of circumventing the prohibition of the so-called lex commissoria.69 
Moreover, a contract concluded by way of self-contracting – as the sale of the apartment in the 
present case where the bank both acted as the buyer and as the representative of the seller – 
would be considered void or voidable under many European legal systems.70 Spanish law may, 
however, be somewhat peculiar with regard to some of these aspects: According to Article 234 of 
the Mortgage Regulation,71 the mortgage agreement must, in order for the specific extra-judicial 
enforcement procedure used in the present case to be available, fix the value of the immovable 
property used as the auction value and determine the person who will sign the sales contract as 
the representative of the mortgagor, and that the creditor itself may be nominated for this 
purpose. Hence, contract terms just reflecting these statutory provisions will not fall within the 
scope of the UCTD due to its Article 1(2). However, there still could be other unfair terms in the 
                                                                
67  This is in fact observed both by the Court (CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 45) and AG Wahl (Opinion 
on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 83), but not considered relevant because it could also have happened 
that a third party had acquired ownership of the apartment. 
68  See AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 71; CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 
48. 
69  This view has been expressed, with regard to Austrian law, by OGH 5 Ob 295/01w 
ECLI:AT:OGH0002:2002:0050OB00295.01W.0115.000. Also, a clause granting the creditor discretion in 
determining the price for selling off collateral assets, or a term allowing to sell for a minimum price that is not the 
market value or at least the value to be achieved in a judicial enforcement procedure are considered void in that 
judgement. For a summary of related Austrian case law, see Wolfgang Faber, §§ 1371, 1372 ABGB, in ABGB 
PRAXISKOMMENTAR, BAND 6, at n. 9 (Michael Schwimann and Georg Kodek eds., 4th ed., 2016). – Rules prohibiting a 
so-called lex commissoria have spread from Roman law (see Codex Theodosianus 3, 2, 1) and are, with certain 
differences as to details, still very common in European jurisdictions; see, for instance: § 1229 BGB (Germany); § 37 
Lag (1915:218) and § 37 Act 1929/228 (Sweden and Finland, respectively). Also French law originally contained a 
prohibition of pacte commissoire clauses (Article 2078 Cc, old version) but changed to a much more liberal 
approach in 2006 (Article 2348 Cc, present version). 
70  See Article II.–6:109 DCFR and the national notes to this provision in PRINCIPLES, DEFINITION AND MODEL RULES OF 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW – DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), FULL EDITION, VOLUME I 437–442 (Christian von Bar 
and Eric Clive eds., 2009). To what extent involving a public notary in the enforcement procedure (as has been the 
case under the respective Spanish rules in the Banco Santander case) may make a decisive difference can hardly 
be assessed without knowing the procedure in detail.  
71  As quoted in CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 14. 
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contract and, in particular, the assessment under another European legal system may be a 
different one.  
(iv) What we have highlighted in this section shows to what extent the CJEU and the AG based their 
reasoning on a rather conceptual way of thinking. It also implies, as we have already shown in the 
introduction, that the concept of ownership played a decisive role. This does not mean that we 
think that the CJEU and the AG in reality limited themselves to such a line of thinking. Looking at 
the additional arguments we opted not to focus on in this article,72 we think there is evidence that 
other ideas were also involved. However, for the analytical purposes of this paper, we would like 
to describe the specific part of the CJEU’s argumentation, which our article focuses on, as a rather 
conceptual way of thinking. This gives us the possibility to contrast this way of thinking with a 
functional one, as we present in the next section. 
B. Forming the Question Functionally 
As outlined above, the first step in an attempt to deal with a case under a functional approach is 
to keep the relations apart and to decide on which relation should be dealt with first, without 
making classifications in terms of specific concept-linked types of legal relationships. In the Banco 
Santander case, there is one thing that immediately becomes apparent when trying to accomplish 
this task, namely that the conflict arises between the same two parties who originally concluded 
the credit contract and the mortgage agreement: the bank and the consumer-debtor. No third 
party has been involved up to the present stage. The situation, irrespective of what kind of right 
one may say the bank has meanwhile acquired, is a mere two-party situation. If the bank had 
transferred the apartment to a subsequent buyer, or another buyer had originally acquired the 
apartment in the forced sale, we would have another conflict to solve. But this is not the case. We 
need to keep the relationship between the consumer and the bank apart from other possible 
issues involving other parties.  
The next step is to identify the ‘real issue’, or the ‘real problem’, in the relation we have identified. 
This involves identifying the parties’ interests in a conflict situation like the one at hand, i.e., in a 
setup constituted by specific facts. Looking at the typical interest of a consumer in such a situation, 
the consumer primarily wants to keep her home. The consumer wants this for both economical 
and emotional reasons. Looking at a bank’s typical interests, the bank wants to earn a profit from 
the interest and fees it contracted for, and to use the apartment to limit the risk it has taken 
through this specific credit agreement. It is important to note that the bank typically just wants to 
limit its risk. Generally, the bank does not want the apartment to make a profit by selling it since 
this is not how banks are supposed to make profits. Banks are not supposed to have an ulterior 
motive to make profit from the customers’ failure to fulfil their credit undertakings. Such motives 
are not in line with the role of a bank as a hub for the resource of credit in society.73 This does, 
                                                                
72  See above, I.C. sub (i). 
73  There is, of course, a lot that can be addressed regarding the role of banks and the regulations that govern this 
role. To just make a few references we suggest: For a few short general remarks see, e.g., John L Douglas, The Role 
of a Banking System in Nation-Building, 60 MAINE LAW REVIEW 511, 512–519 (2008). For a general legal description 
in the English language, see ROSS CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW (3rd ed., 2018). For a perspective of the role 
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however, not mean that a bank can never have an interest to speculate in making profit by taking 
a consumer’s home and selling it at a higher price. When identifying the real problem, the possible 
interest to make profit on customer failure needs to be considered, but it should not be seen as a 
legitimate interest. At this first immediate level the typical conflict of interests between the parties 
is, therefore, rather easy to identify. The consumer wants to keep the home. The bank does not 
want to have the consumer’s apartment, but it wants to limit its risk and the apartment is necessary 
for reaching that goal.  
From the consumer’s perspective, however, the situation is somewhat more complex than we have 
suggested in the previous paragraph. Of course the consumer will primarily be interested in 
keeping her home. Nonetheless, this is a realistic goal only when she sees a chance to solve her 
economic problems to such an extent that she can pay off the bank. If it is already clear for the 
consumer that she will not be able to raise the money to discharge her obligations towards the 
bank, and that she therefore cannot manage to keep her home, the consumer’s interest will be to 
get out of the situation with as little debt left as possible. This means achieving the highest possible 
price in the course of enforcement, and, apart from that, cooperating with the bank in order to be 
charged with as little costs as possible. Still, in reality the interest of the consumer may not be 
simply black or white. Between the two basic situations just described, there may be fifty shades 
of situations where it is more or less unclear for the consumer whether she can solve her economic 
problems and manage to keep her home, or not. In such situations, it may be impossible for the 
consumer to know what actually is best for her. In these cases, the interest of the consumer 
arguably is (a) not to become over-indebted and (b) to be able to get another home (owned, rented 
or otherwise, but a home). It might actually also be in the consumer’s interest to (c) be able to 
protest against the bank’s action for vacating the apartment – although this will make the process 
more costly – and to prolong her stay in the original apartment to see whether there is a way to 
solve her economic problems. That might be achieved by finding a job (if unemployed) or by having 
someone move in and share the rent, etc. Accordingly, in these ‘unclear’ situations, the consumer’s 
interest is not limited to keeping the apartment or getting out of her obligations against the bank 
with the best possible economic result. The consumer’s interests may also depend on other 
factors, such as the possibilities to get another home and the risk to become over-indebted. And 
given that things often are not clear, this may suggest, from the consumer’s perspective, a solution 
that gives her some time to prolong the process. 
As the case may be, it could also prove necessary to further shape the conflict situation by referring 
to specific additional facts which make up the characteristic problem.74 When dealing with this 
issue in the present EU law context, we must also keep in mind that the CJEU, in a preliminary 
ruling, never actually decides the case but has to interpret a provision of EU law. This, too, can have 
an impact on the way questions are phrased in functional terms. 
In the procedure before the referring court, the bank seeks to force the consumer to vacate the 
apartment. This – the question whether the bank can demand the consumer to leave the 
                                                                
of credit institutions in the EU, see THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN THE EU – DIE SOZIALE 
VERANTWORTUNG VON KREDITINSTITUTEN IN DER EU – LA RESPONSABLILITÉ SOCIALE DES INSTITUTIONS FINANCIÈRES AU SEIN DE L´UE 
(Jan Evers and Udo Reifner eds., 1998).  
74  Cf. Wolfgang Faber, Martin Lilja and Günther Kreuzbauer, Employing Argumentation Analysis in the Discussion of 
Optimal Rules for the Transfer of Movables – Part 1: Description of the Problem and General Outline, 1 EUROPEAN 
PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL 10, 22 and (in particular) 39 (2012). 
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apartment, immediately and forever – already forms a ‘real issue’ in terms of a functional approach. 
However, a closer look at the case and the necessity to view the problem from the perspective of 
the CJEU, i.e., with the perspective of interpreting certain provisions of EU law, reveals that this way 
of framing the question does not yet describe the problem sufficiently. We know that the referring 
court’s questions concern that court’s ability, or even its duty, to review potentially unfair terms in 
the mortgage agreement between the bank and the consumer at the procedural stage their conflict 
has reached by now. An answer to this question does not necessarily decide whether the consumer 
can stay or has to go: If the consumer wins before the CJEU, this does not mean that the bank 
ultimately loses. A security agreement, by definition, provides the secured creditor a right to use 
the security object to get paid. The bank, in any case, will – and should – be able to do that. The 
question therefore is just whether the bank can act immediately by evicting the consumer and then 
use the apartment in whatever way that appears suitable, or whether the bank must wait until the 
judicial review of potentially unfair terms is completed. In the latter case, the bank can either 
proceed as intended (if no unfair terms are found) or may be required to follow the common 
procedure for the realisation of collateral (if contract terms relating to enforcement prove to be 
unfair). In any of these situations the consumer faces the immediate risk of being forced to leave. 
But during the time frame that occurs in the latter situations the consumer may perhaps raise the 
money to pay the bank. The latter possibility – judicial review allowed, unfair terms detected, 
enforcement therefore thrown back to ordinary judicial enforcement – means the consumer may 
even have a chance to keep ‘her’ apartment within her own patrimony, by paying off the bank.  
To formulate the real issue, we first take into account that the CJEU is asked to give a normative 
answer in terms of interpreting a provision of EU law in a preliminary ruling procedure. Second, no 
CJEU guidance so far exists for situations where the consumer, at the procedural stage reached by 
now, actively requests the national court to review potentially unfair contract terms. Third, there is 
no such guidance either in cases where the consumer does not (but the court could still review the 
mortgage contract of its own motion). Thus, the CJEU could frame the ‘real issue’ with the purpose 
of delivering guidance for both of these situations.75 The ‘real issue’ could then be formulated as 
follows:  
Should a judicial review of potentially unfair terms in a security agreement be excluded76 once the 
security right in the consumer’s apartment has been enforced and the creditor-bank itself has 
acquired the apartment in the forced sale, and therefore seeks to force the consumer out of the 
apartment?77 
This question arises for situations (a) where the consumer itself asks the national court for such 
review, and (b) where the consumer remains passive and it would be on the national court to 
undertake such review of its own motion. In the latter situation, if the answer to the above question 
                                                                
75  This would be a constructive approach with a view of providing as much guidance as reasonably possible within 
the frame set by the questions referred to the CJEU in the particular preliminary ruling procedure. It is clear, 
however, that the actual questions only address the latter situation in which the consumer remained passive. 
76  This is the actual question of law to be decided by yes or no: Can (or must) the court still carry out such a review, 
or is this excluded? 
77  This part of the question describes the specific situation which is characteristic for the case: Enforcement has taken 
place and the bank itself has acquired the collateral. 
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is that a judicial review of potentially unfair terms is not excluded, the additional question arises 
whether the court is merely allowed to act of its own motion or whether it is even under a duty to 
do so.78 For both situations, the additional fact is submitted that, so far, neither did a court have to 
start such an assessment ex officio, nor did the consumer have a possibility to effectively initiate 
such an investigation.79 
In other words, the real issue is whether there should be a limitation of the possibilities to examine 
the unfairness of a consumer’s credit agreement, and whether this limit should be set precisely at 
the time when the creditor-bank acquires the apartment. If so, the effect would be equivalent to a 
rule of limitation (in the sense of a limitation of actions). This would be a quite relevant aspect, as 
will become apparent when we will involve the possible consequences of a decision in our 
discussion.80 A decision, especially a preliminary ruling of the CJEU, becomes a future norm to be 
followed in other situations as well, and the decision is therefore a decision upon what norm 
should be created for cases like the one at hand. 
Contrasting this way of forming the question with the analysis carried out by the AG and the CJEU, 
we can now also see what is not the issue under a functional approach: Actual or potential effects 
on third parties are not relevant for the formulation of the question because no third party is 
actually involved in the conflict. Nor are the concepts of ‘ownership’ or of ‘rights in rem’ needed to 
coin the question. The aspects that the stage of enforcement proceedings has already been left, 
and that the bank has acquired the apartment in the course of this enforcement, are mentioned, 
but it is not considered important for formulating the question whether the course of events 
involved procedures of type (a) or of type (b) as referred to in the previous section.81 
An interesting remark concerning the move to clarify the ‘real issue’ is that the CJEU regularly does 
something similar. When the question referred by the national court does not offer a possibility to 
reply to in a meaningful way, the CJEU has often rephrased the question. The Court then uses a 
phrase like “in order to give a useful answer” to indicate that the judges have identified a more 
useful question to reply upon.82 It would, therefore, not be a radical step for the CJEU to include a 
technique like the shaping of the ‘real issue’ into its everyday work.  
C. How to Argue the Issue Functionally 
We will now move on to step 3 as described in section II.B. The third step is to identify everything 
that is relevant to construct a solution and to turn all these aspects into arguments. We have 
limited the number of arguments that we present to what we think is enough to illustrate our point. 
                                                                
78  These variations extend the question originally referred by the national court to several possible situations, in 
order to deliver broader guidance for the interpretation of Articles 6(1) and 7 UCTD. 
79  Since the issue, in EU law terms, ultimately is delimiting the scope of the principle of effectiveness, a clarification 
like this has to be added. 
80  See, in particular, section III.C.2. sub (iii) and (iv) below. 
81  See section III.A. sub (ii). Note that under ‘real’ Spanish law, there actually may be a difference whether the 
procedure is ‘summary’ (where defences are restricted and a defect in the acquisition process cannot be raised) 
or ‘plenary’ (where the legitimacy of the acquisition of property rights may effectively be called into question). See 
section I.C. sub (ii) above. 
82  See, e.g., CJEU, Case C-122/17 David Smith v Patrick Meade and others ECLI:EU:C:2018:631 paras. 34–36; Case C-
25/15 István Balogh ECLI:EU:C:2016:423 paras. 28–33; AG Szpunar, Opinion on Case C-135/15 Hellenic Republic v 
Grigorios Nikiforidis ECLI:EU:C:2016:281 paras. 54, 56. As to substance, the CJEU reformulated the questions 
referred to it also in the present Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 32; see supra note 4. 
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1. Normative Arguments 
If available, relevant normative propositions of various kinds (EU legislation, national statutory 
provisions, court rulings, general legal principles and values) have to be taken into account for 
solving the ‘real issue’. This may be an easy task if there is one applicable rule fully fitting to the 
case at hand. Regarding a case like Banco Santander, things are not as simple. 
(i) There are, of course, relevant norms on the EU law level: Article 6(1) UCTD provides that unfair 
terms in consumer contracts shall not be binding on the consumer, and under Article 7(1) UCTD, 
Member States must ensure that adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use 
of unfair terms in consumer contracts. On this basis, the CJEU has developed an extensive body of 
case law on the principle of effectiveness related to that Directive as well as on the national courts’ 
duty to review potentially unfair contract terms ex officio in particular.83 However, the mere 
existence of this normative material does not help much in solving issues such as in Banco 
Santander – precisely because the issue is the possible limitation of the ‘power’ these norms may 
exercise, or the scope they may apply to, in view of national (Spanish or other) norms potentially 
operating in the opposite direction. In the present Spanish case these national norms are such of 
civil procedure (defining a stand-alone type of procedure to enforce registered rights in rem) and 
substantive property law (awarding an ‘owner’ a certain degree of legal protection). 
(ii) However, one can still try to concretise some characteristics – potential strengths or weaknesses 
– of these normative propositions. This will make it easier to deal with these normative aspects in 
the final weighing of arguments. Regarding the national (Spanish or other) rules on civil procedure 
and substantive property law, for instance, a closer analysis may reveal that these rules in 
themselves imply potential gateways for ‘acquisition flaws’ to creep in. A specific procedure for 
enforcing a right in rem, by putting the person so entitled into possession of the object, may or 
may not depend, as a prerequisite, on the rightful acquisition of said property right. This acquisition 
could depend on a fully valid obligation to transfer (‘causal transfer’), which may prove lacking if 
clauses in the mortgage agreement that are material for the final forced sale turn out to be unfair. 
There may also be a second type of procedure available for retrospectively challenging the bank’s 
acquisition, as apparently is the case in Spanish law.84 All this can vary from system to system. As 
we have pointed out, we do not consider it to be our task to settle these questions for Spanish law, 
but we think the point is made that ‘ownership’, even if perceived in its most traditional way, can 
be vulnerable and that ‘ownership’, if required as a prerequisite in a specific type of civil procedure 
between two parties, serves a relational function. 
In this context, another principle of EU law may also become relevant: the principle of equivalence. 
This principle often comes into play in relation to procedural rules of national law, but is not limited 
to this area. According to settled CJEU case law, rules on certain procedural aspects are, in the 
absence of EU legislation in the specific area, a matter for the national legal order, in accordance 
with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States. However, these rules “must 
                                                                
83  See supra note 3. 
84  See I.C. sub (ii) above. 
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not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence)”.85 
Transposing this principle into the present context could lead to the following conclusion: National 
law may provide that a transfer of ownership based on an obligation that turns out to be void or 
avoidable (under a provision of national law) is to be treated as never having taken proprietary 
effect (retroactive proprietary effect).86 If such a rule of national law exists, the EU law principle of 
equivalence requires that, where a contract term in a consumer mortgage agreement forms the 
basis of a transfer of ownership to the acquirer-bank, and a national court finds this term to be 
‘unfair’ and therefore not binding, this would have to trigger exactly the same proprietary effect as 
if a term forming the basis of the acquisition were found void under a provision of national law: 
the acquisition would have to be treated as ineffective from the outset. If the comparable provision 
of national law states that the invalidity of the contract term must be reviewed ex officio, the same 
must apply to the reviewing of a potentially unfair term in the sense of the Directive.87 
(iii) Furthermore, an attempt of concretising the Directive’s standards of effectiveness with regard 
to a natural person’s need for appropriate housing will show that there is existing CJEU case law 
on the effectiveness of the UCTD, according to which the fact that the object of an enforcement 
procedure is the consumer’s family home must be given specific attention. The Court maintains 
that the fundamental freedom of housing, as enshrined in Article 7 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (respect for private and family life, home and communications) is to be taken 
into account when interpreting the UCTD.88 This finding does not form a clear precedent; there are 
differences in that the Banco Santander case starts after the enforcement procedure has already 
been completed.89 Still, one can note for further discussion that the fact that a person or family 
might lose their home is given specific weight by the CJEU when delimiting the effectiveness of the 
UCTD. This concretises the normative force of the rules stating that unfair contract terms must not 
be binding on the consumer, where the family home is at risk. 
(iv) There are also further normative indications we can derive from the UCTD. It is clear from the 
Directive that, to assess the unfairness of contractual terms, regard must be given to the purpose 
of the contract;90 that is, in the present case of a mortgage agreement, to provide security. It is also 
clear from Recital 16 UCTD that in order to be treated as dealing in good faith, the professional 
                                                                
85  See CJEU, Case C-40/08 Asturcom paras. 38 and 49 ff.; see also, among many others, CJEU, Case C-76/10 
Pohotovosť paras. 47 ff.; Case C-488/11, Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse, Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:341 paras. 42 ff., all of them dealing with this principle in relation to the national court’s duty to 
apply the rules implementing the UCTD ex officio. For a broader discussion, see, for instance, KÖNIG, supra note 
49, at 92 ff. 
86  As provided, e.g., by Spanish law; see Pacanowska and Díez Soto, supra note 57, at 545 ff. See also Article VIII.–
2:202(1) and (2) DCFR with Comment B and the national notes on these provisions in von Bar and Clive, supra note 
39, at 4656 ff. 
87  Compare, again, CJEU, Case C-40/08 Asturcom paras. 53 ff. 
88  See CJEU, Case C-34/13 Monika Kušionová v SMART Capital a.s. ECLI:EU:C:2014:2189 paras. 62–66. Cf. also CJEU, 
Case C-415/11 Aziz para. 61 and Case C-169/14 Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo, María del Carmen Abril García v 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099 paras. 38, 43. 
89  This has been duly observed by AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 58–68 (see supra, 
III.A. sub (ii)). Note, however, that we are not employing this difference as a decisive one from the beginning, but 
aim at taking it into account just as one aspect among many. 
90  In the language of Article 4(1) UCTD, the “nature of the goods or services”, “all the circumstances attending the 
conclusion of the contract” and “all the other terms of the contract” are to be taken into account; cf. Thomas 
Pfeiffer, Art 4 RL 93/13/EWG, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION, BAND IV: SEKUNDÄRRECHT, at n. 7 (Eberhard Grabitz, 
Meinhard Hilf and Martin Nettesheim eds., 1999); Andreas Fuchs, § 307 BGB, in AGB-RECHT, at n. 116 (Peter Ulmer, 
Hans Erich Brandner and Horst-Diether Hensen eds., 12th ed., 2016). 
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party must deal fairly and equitably and must take the other party’s legitimate interests into 
account. As we have already discussed, the security provider’s (consumer’s) legitimate interest is 
that the secured creditor and the contract terms provided by the creditor seek to achieve the best 
price possible in the case the security right must be enforced.91 
2. Arguments from Assumptions on Possible Consequences, Value-based Arguments etc 
As mentioned above, the functionalist aim of identifying relevant arguments also involves dealing 
with potential consequences the possible solutions may trigger. This endeavour is often based on 
assumptions (given the future is uncertain and empiric evidence on standard causal relations is 
usually not available). Lawyers deciding or arguing a case have a high tendency to make 
assumptions such as this, even though they might do it subconsciously. In a functionalist thought 
process the ambition is to do it explicitly. We have identified a number of arguments of the kind 
we assume lawyers to contemplate in a case like Banco Santander. In this section we present them 
in an order that we hope is easy to follow.  
(i) We would like to start by pointing out that the CJEU and AG Wahl themselves use such 
‘consequence-based arguments’. They point at the fact that it could create problems if other 
property right holders would run the risk of having their rights contested by an unfair term.92 As 
mentioned above, this argument does not appear to be very valid when the bank itself has bought 
the property. The argument could, however, be interpreted as implying that the register should 
have high formal legitimacy in order to be trusted, since trust and lack of trust are important 
consequences. Still, this is not a real problem before someone else actually put trust in the register. 
With a more explicit analysis than what we can read from the CJEU and the AG, this becomes 
evident.  
(ii) AG Wahl also forms an argument from the consequences of granting a possibility to challenge 
clauses in the mortgage agreement insofar as he expresses doubts whether such course of action 
would really create any benefit for the consumer: If the sale in the extra-judicial enforcement would 
consequently be ineffective, this would mean that the consumer would still be bound to the credit 
contract and the entire debt would be due at once.93 This is correct. However, as has been pointed 
out before, this may still be within the consumer’s interest, depending on how realistic it is for her 
to raise the money in time, even if there is a risk in the end there will be higher costs to cover, 
among other factors.94 In this context, one may also say that it is evidently better from a consumer 
perspective to have a certain right, including the option not to exercise this right, than having no 
right at all. The option of not asserting one’s right based on a free and informed consent to the 
term in question also applies in proceedings initiated by an ex officio intervention by the court.95  
                                                                
91  See supra, III.B. 
92  See CJEU, Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 45; AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander paras. 
82 f. 
93  See AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 80. 
94  See section III.B. on a consumer’s interests in situations where it is not clear at the outset whether the money can 
be raised or not. 
95  Cf., in this respect, AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 80, with reference to CJEU, Case C-
472/11 Banif Plus Bank Zrt v Csaba Csipai, Viktória Csipai ECLI:EU:C:2013:88 para. 35; Joined Cases C-381/14 and 
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(iii) The following aspect is neither discussed in the CJEU’s judgement nor in the AG’s opinion, but 
certainly attracts a lawyer’s attention. The bank was, by way of a contract clause, given power to 
represent the consumer ‘as seller’ in a forced sale.96 At the same time, the bank was intended to 
be allowed to act ‘as buyer’ in that forced sale. The bank’s possibility to represent the consumer 
creates a conflict of interests on the part of the bank,97 which materialises in two related aspects: 
(a) A bank using such a contract term can, in lieu of other interested buyers,98 acquire the 
apartment for a rather low price. If the real estate market improves later, the bank can sell off the 
apartment for a much higher price (the point in time for both transactions is exclusively 
determined by the bank), with the intention of keeping the surplus for itself. (b) If a bank, using 
self-contracting, acquires the apartment for a low price, this means that rather little money is 
cashed in by the forced sale and, in turn, the consumer’s credit obligation will remain unpaid and 
due at a relatively high amount. On these grounds, the bank can further charge (more) interest, 
and it can ultimately use other means of enforcement, if available, to receive the money.  
Now, if the ultimate decision for the ‘real issue’ was to exclude any judicial review of potentially 
unfair terms at the present stage of proceedings, this would operate as an incentive for banks to 
proceed just the way described above. This would not only imply the risks of self-contracting as 
stated in the previous paragraph, this course of conduct could also be used in a strategic manner 
to cover up even further potentially unfair terms. Evidently, this would run contrary to the 
Directive’s intention to produce a deterring effect99 in order to put an end to the use of unfair 
terms. 
If, however, the ‘real issue’ is decided in favour of a judicial review to be carried out even at the 
present stage of proceedings, and if this review happens to reveal the unfairness of certain 
contract terms frequently used by banks, this may have a considerable impact on future contract 
practice in general. Banks will tend to adopt standard terms surviving the unfairness test imposed 
by the Directive. “To prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts” is in fact a major goal 
of the UCTD, explicitly highlighted in its Article 7(1) and repeatedly used as a prominent argument 
in the CJEU’s case law in order to elaborate, in particular, on the dissuasive effect the Directive is 
intended to produce.100 The latter is of course a normative argument, but as it builds upon 
consequences, it is mentioned in the present context. 
(iv) Awarding the bank a chance to earn even more money than it could expect to earn under the 
credit contract does not comply with the role of banks in the credit system; at least such a 
                                                                
C-385/14 Jorge Sales Sinués v Caixabank SA and Youssouf Drame Ba v Catalunya Caixa SA (Catalunya Banc SA) 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:252 para. 25. 
96  To this extent, the contract reproduces Spanish legal provisions and therefore does not fall within the ambit of the 
UCTD according to its Article 1(2); see supra, III.A. sub (i). 
97  As mentioned above (supra note 70) we do not have sufficient knowledge of the precise role of the public notary 
in the specific Spanish enforcement procedure in order to assess to what extent the conflict of interests actually 
is to be seen as problematic in the specific case. But we tend to think the involvement of a notary does not render 
the issue completely unproblematic. In any case, the discussion provided in the text aims to show what kinds of 
problems self-contracting may raise in a setting like the Banco Santander case. 
98  This risk may have been a substantial one in Spain during the financial crisis. It may have been difficult to find 
other potential buyers also because of the fact that the former owner (the consumer-debtor) still lived there and 
market participants anticipated it could be difficult to evict her. 
99  See the next paragraph at note 100. 
100  See, among many others, CJEU, Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito paras. 68–71; Case C-26/13, Árpád Kásler, 
Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 paras. 78–84. 
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possibility is highly questionable.101 There are of course many different ways to understand the 
role of the very complex institution of banks, but a possible way of explaining one part of the role 
of banks is to point at the stability they should provide. From this perspective they are supposed 
to gain from the margin of interest rates. A bank’s expectation under a secured credit contract is 
to earn a profit from interest and fees, secured by a proprietary security. The function of a security 
right is limited to what is to be secured. Contract terms allowing the bank to acquire the collateral 
itself by way of self-contracting, at a potentially overly low price, and selling it off for a higher price 
without attributing the surplus to the security provider, are thus to be seen quite critically. If banks 
are allowed to speculate in the risk, or rather chance, of consumers’ failure to discharge their credit 
obligations, this might affect the stability of the bank, and thereby the financial system. One part 
of the risk could be that banks start competing on the market by offering interest rates that are 
calculated from the possible surplus the speculation in consumer failure may generate. This has 
the positive effect of lower interest rates, but it also implies the risk that speculations of a bank do 
not work out as intended. From the perspective we use here, a bank’s role is not to take speculative 
kinds of risks. The other part of the risk is that consumers in general may start to distrust the 
motives of banks. This can also potentially lead to distrust against banks when it comes to lending 
money to the banks. If consumers avoid using banks, the effect might be damaging for the financial 
system as a whole. What actually affects the trust in banks and the financial market is, however, 
something that still needs more research; so does the question of whether or not speculative 
behaviour of banks is beneficial. What we do know is that the concepts of stability and systemic 
risks are central concepts for our understanding of the roles of banks in the society.102  
What we discuss here is based on the assumption that comparable clauses may have been used 
in many consumer mortgage contracts by many banks. The possible consequence we are pointing 
at is that contract terms allowing the bank to make profit on consumer failure may have unwanted 
effects at aggregate level. This is a rather clear argument in favour of deciding the ‘real issue’ in 
terms of also allowing a judicial review at a late stage of the bank’s process of using the security to 
cover the debt. Such a decision would limit the risks we point at, although it would just be by 
blocking a rather small possibility for the banks to make such profit.  
It is also relevant to consider the possible consequences of establishing such a norm through a 
court decision. When a norm is created by the judiciary, market participants do not get a transition 
period, as they usually do when norms are established through legislation. In this context, a 
                                                                
101  Compare, on a normative level, Article 28(5) Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 
2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L60/34. However, this directive has not 
yet been applicable to the Banco Santander case; see the transitional provisions in Article 43(1) Directive 
2014/17/EU. 
102  See the definition in Article 3(1)(10) Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on access 
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L176/338; see also, 
e.g., Philipp Hartmann, Olivier de Bandt and José Luis Peydró, Systemic Risk in Banking after the Great Financial 
Crisis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 667 (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux and John O. S. Wilson eds., 2nd 
ed., 2014, online 2015); SYSTEMIC RISK, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, AND THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS (Anita Anand ed., 
2016, online 2017); Andrew G. Haldane and Robert M. May, Systemic risk in banking ecosystems, (2011) Nature 
351 (Vol. 469).  
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problem could occur if any of the possible solutions to the ‘real issue’ could cause unexpected 
major losses for the banking industry at large. However, since the bank, in a setting like the Banco 
Santander case, would at least retain a proprietary security right for the same claim it originally 
had, we assume that no such major consequences are to be anticipated in this regard. 
(v) Another assumption on risk concerns the security object. If a judicial review of potentially unfair 
terms is declared still possible or even necessary, the bank faces an additional risk that the 
apartment may deteriorate in value because of the simple fact that it is used every day and this 
causes wear and tear. This consequence, in principle, is very likely to occur. However, there is no 
equally tenable prognosis on how significant such deterioration would probably be. On the one 
hand, one could have reasons to assume that the consumer, if she is allowed to remain in the 
apartment, would take reasonable care of it. On the other hand, there may be reasons to assume, 
and even certain empiric support, that a person in economic distress is more likely to take bigger 
risks;103 this might also affect the state of the apartment. Evidently, this makes it difficult to find an 
appropriate way of how to measure such (partly contradictory) assumptions. In a practical case 
before a (national) court, it may sometimes be possible to deliver particular evidence to make an 
assumption more specific or clarify its likelihood. After all, deciding the ‘real issue’ in terms of 
excluding any further mortgage contract review right away appears to be slightly preferable to the 
bank. However, the bank’s main interest of at least keeping some sort of proprietary security for 
its claim is also served if the opposite decision were made. The economic value of the security may 
be somewhat lower, depending on further wear and tear. Further, the real estate market may 
develop in one or the other direction. 
(vi) It should be kept in mind that the effect that a consumer who cannot pay will lose the object 
over which the security right has been created, is not unfair as such. The consumer’s interest of 
keeping his or her home is, however, not the only interest the consumer typically has.104 In case 
this goal cannot be achieved, a consumer, in the capacity of debtor and mortgagor, has an evident 
interest of achieving the best possible economic result once the apartment is lost. In the present 
case, this would mean achieving a better result than 60% of the (former) market value. 
Theoretically, this could be attained in different ways, including: retrospectively avoiding the forced 
sale and enforcing the mortgage under the ordinary judicial enforcement procedure (at a time 
when prices may have started to go up again after the financial crisis) or, if the bank is allowed to 
keep the apartment, by imposing on the bank an obligation to deduct any income gained from the 
apartment (by way of sale or renting out to a third person) from the consumer’s remaining credit 
obligation. 
(vii) Other arguments concerning the sale of the security object have to do with assumptions on 
how banks will act if they are still subject to an ex officio intervention by the court in the process 
of evacuation. Would banks then change their behaviour and never buy the mortgaged property 
themselves? Is it possible to assume that excluding banks from the market would lead to a less 
favourable outcome for the consumer, since the prices fall if there is one buyer less on the market? 
Would the banks instead use partner enterprises, who they ask to buy the security object? Would 
the possibility of ex officio interventions affect the interest in and incentive for special 
                                                                
103  See, e.g., REINHARD H. SCHMIDT, ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE DES INSOLVENZRECHTS 27 (1980). 
104  This aspect has already been touched supra, III.B. What we add here are more detailed deliberations as to the 
consumer’s interest to achieve the best economic result if the credit debt cannot be paid. 
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arrangements under a general economic crisis? Might the effect be that consumers in general will 
receive less help from the state? Or maybe more help? How will private helping initiatives be 
affected? – These are all questions that are arduous to answer. To some people it may seem 
evident how a bank would behave if the court, or the consumer, could still intervene. It is, however, 
not easy to understand how all other aspects affect a decision to act in a certain kind of situation. 
Maybe the most probable change in behaviour would be that banks change their credit contracts, 
so that they seem less unfair from an EU law perspective (provided the contracts used by the 
particular bank actually contain unfair terms). 
(viii) Yet another argument concerning how the bank might be affected is our assumption that the 
bank’s interests would not be impaired substantially if a judicial review of terms in the mortgage 
contract was held to be still possible or even necessary at the present procedural stage. As 
previously mentioned, such a decision would not mean that the bank ultimately loses the 
possibility to sell the apartment.105 If a judicial review of potentially unfair terms is allowed, the 
bank – depending on the outcome of that review – will either remain in its present position of being 
the ‘owner’ of the apartment, or will be restored in its former position as a security-right holder 
with a valid secured claim, in which case the options are that either the bank will be paid (if the 
consumer can use the time to raise the money) or the bank can enforce its security right, probably 
by way of traditional judicial enforcement. Since the bank’s basic interest is to gain the money it 
contracted for,106 all these possible courses of events serve that interest to a more or less 
comparable extent, with the reservation that any solution allowing the consumer to stay in the 
apartment, for the additional time any kind of proceedings may last, involves the additional risk 
for the bank that the apartment may depreciate as a consequence of this using.107  
(ix) One can also form an argument from presumptive practical difficulties the consumer may face 
when a judicial review is no longer allowed at the present stage. Making the case depend on a strict 
procedural distinction among proceedings carried out between the same two parties108 may 
potentially imply a significant risk that the consumer will miss the point up to which she would 
have to bring complaints on the ground of allegedly unfair terms. Note that the enforcement 
procedure before the notary is finalised without any involvement of the consumer (the bank 
acquired the apartment by way of self-contracting). Under such circumstances, the consumer 
might be unaware of the caesura between the two formally distinct procedures. Given that, under 
CJEU case law, consumers’ unawareness of their rights awarded by EU law is considered 
problematic in terms of compliance with the principle of effectiveness,109 this can support an 
argument against excluding any judicial review of unfair terms at the present stage. 
                                                                
105  See supra, III.B. 
106  Cf. supra, III.B. 
107  See supra, III.C.2. sub (v). 
108  The distinction is between the procedure between the contracting parties based on the mortgage contract on the 
one hand (proceedings ‘type (a)’ as categorised above) and proceedings – still, between the same contracting 
parties – based on the bank’s meanwhile acquired ‘right of ownership’ on the other hand (proceedings ‘type (b)’). 
Cf. supra, III.A. sub (ii). 
109  For references, see III.D.2. below with note 121. 
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(x) Finally, there might be arguments regarding the development of the overall relationship 
between bank and consumer, disregarding the original terms of the contract. If the bank allows 
the consumer to stay in the apartment for a long time after the acquisition and therefore waits 
with evacuation proceedings, it may seem that the bank is not ‘rewarded’ for this kindness. This 
may be an argument that AG Wahl took into account, although he did not mention it explicitly.110 
(xi) We do not claim that we have identified each and every aspect that may potentially be relevant 
for solving the ‘real issue’ in a case like Banco Santander. However, with the normative arguments 
(III.C.1.) and the further arguments listed in this section (III.C.2.) we think we have presented 
enough to illustrate our point: that a reasonable solution can be developed without making the 
case strictly depend on a concept like ‘ownership’. We also hope that the arguments we have 
identified will not be considered peculiar, but rather as arguments that lawyers would have 
contemplated anyway when dealing openly and consciously with a comparable case. 
D. Weighing of Arguments 
The fourth and final step, as described in section II.B, is to weigh the arguments prepared in step 
3. To achieve a solution to the ‘real problem’, the decisive and most important arguments are 
subjected to a final evaluation (if need be),111 linked to and weighed against one another, and are 
finally put together in an argumentation to solve the issue. To do this it might be useful to 
recapitulate the ‘real issue’:  
Should a judicial review of potentially unfair terms in a security agreement be excluded once the 
security right in the consumer’s apartment has been enforced and the creditor-bank itself has 
acquired the apartment in the forced sale, and therefore seeks to force the consumer out of the 
apartment?112 
As indicated above, there is no specific method or normative framework for carrying out the 
weighing process. We will therefore proceed as we consider it appropriate and, given that legal 
norms evidently require to be given specific weight in the process, start with them. Please 
remember that we are doing a researcher’s task here and that we have limited the facts of the 
Banco Santander case to what seemed relevant for us to show how a functional approach would 
operate in contrast to formal-conceptual reasoning. We are, in other words, not deciding ‘the real 
case’. 
1. Another Evaluation of the Norms 
A weighing process to decide the ‘real issue’ could start by again checking whether there is a norm 
or comparable normative proposition – in our case: a provision of EU law or an existing preliminary 
ruling by the CJEU – that addresses the ‘real issue’ in a direct way. If so, this norm would have to 
                                                                
110  Compare AG Wahl, Opinion on Case C-598/15 Banco Santander para. 79. 
111  In the present article, this evaluative task, to a relatively large extent, has already been accomplished in the 
previous sections in order to deal with the individual aspects where they arise. 
112  Cf. III.B. above: Note that we have clarified there that this main question arises for different factual situations and 
can, depending on the answer to that main question, trigger additional questions as to whether a judicial review 
is to be carried out only upon the consumer’s application or ex officio; and whether an ex officio review is merely 
allowed or even necessary. 
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assume a high priority in the weighing process. However, we already know that such a ‘clear norm’ 
of EU law does not exist for the issue to be decided in the present case.113 
It is also clear that there are no provisions of national (in this case: Spanish) law which could claim 
to settle the issue once and for all. We have seen that the Spanish property law provisions on the 
acquisition of ownership depend on a valid obligation to transfer the ownership from the 
consumer to the bank in the course of the forced sale (‘causal’ transfer), and that the validity of this 
obligation may be questionable if the mortgage agreement was affected by unfair enforcement-
related contract terms.114 To what extent this dependency actually exits in a particular case would, 
first, depend on whether and which contract terms ultimately turn out to be unfair. Second, this 
would be the task of the national court to sort out according to the division of work between the 
national court and the CJEU in a preliminary ruling procedure.115  
Regarding the Spanish procedural provisions, we have seen that the specific type of procedure for 
enforcing registered rights in rem is a summary procedure only, which does not have the effect of 
res iudicata and does not produce a final decision as to the rightful or wrongful acquisition of 
ownership by the bank; the latter is left to a ‘plenary’ procedure.116 The conclusion to be drawn 
from this is, however, not self-evident. One could either argue that the inexistence of any right to 
invoke, in the summary procedure, the unfairness of terms of the mortgage agreement is not that 
detrimental for the consumer because she could still revise the result in a subsequent ‘plenary’ 
procedure. Or one could point to the fact that the apartment is the consumer’s only present 
housing option and that this may speak strongly against forcing the consumer out of her home 
before the review of potentially unfair terms has been settled.117 Given that we do not have 
sufficient knowledge of national Spanish procedural law, the exact weight these national provisions 
should be awarded in the weighing procedure must be left open here.  
It will, however, be evident that the final assessment of these implications of national property law 
and procedural law would have a strong impact on the weight the national norms may assume in 
an ‘absolutely final’ weighing process. Further, it should have become apparent already from our 
previous discussion that the potential result regarding the ‘real issue’ may vary depending on which 
national legal system is concerned. It should, however, also be made clear that even if a specific 
national legal system provides that a transfer of ownership is perfectly independent from the 
validity of the underlying obligation,118 and that the same is true for proceedings enforcing such a 
                                                                
113  See section III.C.1. 
114  See above, I.C. sub (ii). 
115  Compare, among many others, CJEU, Case C-433/11 SKP k.s. v Kveta Polhošová ECLI:EU:C:2012:702 para. 22; Case 
C-297/88 Massam Dzodzi v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:1990:360 para. 33. 
116  See above, I.C. sub (ii). 
117  Cf. supra, III.C.1. sub (iii) and the CJEU case law referred to in note 88. 
118  At least at first sight this would hold true with regard to German law, which provides for an ‘abstract’ transfer of 
ownership, i.e., a valid underlying obligation is not required for a transfer to take place, if only a valid ‘real 
agreement’ has been concluded between transferor and transferee. However, a transfer based on an invalid 
obligation would immediately trigger an obligation to re-transfer the property under unjust enrichment rules. See, 
for instance, Mary-Rose McGuire, National Report on the Transfer of Movables in Germany, in NATIONAL REPORTS ON 
THE TRANSFER OF MOVABLES IN EUROPE, VOLUME 3 1, 73 ff. (Wolfgang Faber and Brigitta Lurger eds., 2011). This obligation 
to re-transfer might still operate as a gateway for defects in the underlying obligation to break through as long as 
the parties are still the same. 
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right, the question whether these national provisions decide the solution to the case may still 
depend on the EU law principle of effectiveness. 
Further, we can say that if a particular national legal system provides a ‘causal’ transfer as 
mentioned above, and if it should ultimately turn out that certain terms in the consumer mortgage 
agreement which are material for the non-judicial enforcement procedure are to be considered 
‘unfair’ within the meaning of the Directive, there would be a quite strong argument from the EU 
principle of equivalence that the invalidity of the contract term should cause the transfer of 
ownership to be ineffective. The reason is that the same effect would be triggered if the invalidity 
of the contract was caused by a rule of national law.119 This is, in itself, not really a functional way 
of reasoning; but given that functional argumentation is intended to include all normative premises 
the case may involve, this kind of EU-law driven argument is taken account of. In any case, this 
argument can start only when it has been clarified that certain contract terms are ‘unfair’; it does 
not contribute to the question of unfairness itself, nor does it contribute to the assessment of the 
ambit of the effectiveness principle, which forms a separate and additional requirement. 
2. Weighing Some of the Normative and Consequence-based Arguments 
The arguments we weigh in this subsection are mainly from III.C.1. sub (i)–(iii) and III.C.2. sub (i) and 
(iii). One of these arguments claims that it is necessary to limit the consumer’s possibilities to have 
contract terms reviewed because a third party who trusts the register might otherwise be affected. 
We have already pointed out that this is a weak argument for those cases where there are only 
two parties involved. The argument could, however, be interpreted in another, more favourable, 
way to make it useful. It could be interpreted as an argument for implementing one general rule 
(such as: ‘Once the acquirer is registered, this cannot be challenged’) without exemptions. Such a 
solution may be said to have the advantage of simplification. This would, however, be a quite 
unusual rule. To have different rules concerning a two-party relationship and a third-party 
relationship is indeed very common. There need not even be a good faith solution involved.  
A rule without any exception may also cause problems in the relationship between the two parties 
to the original mortgage agreement. One aspect, as previously mentioned, is that according to the 
CJEU, a person’s need for housing has to be given specific weight when interpreting the UCTD, 
notably when delimiting the appropriate scope of the effectiveness principle.120 Further, the 
enforcement procedure before the notary was finalised without any involvement of the consumer 
and the latter is therefore likely not to be aware that there are in fact two formally distinct 
procedures. This observation can be linked to further CJEU case law according to which the fact 
that the consumer “is unaware of or does not appreciate the extent of his rights” can have a 
substantial impact on the assessment that procedural rules fail to comply with the Directive’s 
principle of effectiveness.121 
                                                                
119  See supra, III.C.1. sub (ii). 
120  See supra, III.C.1. sub (iii), with references in note 88. 
121  See, to this effect, CJEU, Case C-415/11 Aziz para. 58; Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito para. 54; Joined 
Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Rocío Murciano Quintero and others ECLI:EU:C:2000:346 
para. 26 (all regarding the UCTD and the national court’s duty to review contract terms ex officio). See also CJEU, 
Case C-32/12, Soledad Duarte Hueros v Autociba SA, Automóviles Citroën España SA ECLI:EU:C:2013:637 para. 38 
regarding Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associated guarantees (Consumer Sales Directive) [1999] OJ L171/12. 
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Further, on a very general level, there seems to be little reason why bringing a complaint on the 
ground of unfair contract terms should no longer be possible for the consumer if it is still only the 
consumer and the professional who are parties to the conflict. If only these two parties can be 
affected by deciding the conflict, a formal change in the bank’s ‘type of right’ and in the ‘type of 
procedure’ should arguably not form a sufficient barrier against the Directive’s entire purpose of 
awarding consumers protection against unfair contract terms applied by the other party. 
Considering that the UCTD intends to create a deterring effect towards professionals,122 the 
decision of the conflict at hand should certainly not operate as an incentive for professionals to 
put an end on the courts’ ability to review unfair terms (by acquiring collateral on their own). 
Rather, there should be an incentive for the professional to achieve the highest proceeds possible 
when the enforcement of a security right turns out to be necessary.123 
3. Weighing the Arguments Concerning Risks 
Some arguments we have presented concern the bank’s risk that the value of the apartment may 
deteriorate through use during the additional time a judicial review of unfair terms would take.124 
These arguments do, however, not suggest that this possible increase of risk is significant. The 
same risks are present also in general, including cases where the sale of the security object takes 
some time for whatever other reason there may be.  
Other kinds of risks have to do with the role of banks in general; we have referred to them as 
systemic risks.125 When weighing arguments on systemic risks it is of course important to 
understand that these are arguments on an aggregated level. They do not directly match the 
arguments on the party-to-party level, and they, therefore, need to be treated as arguments from 
another level when it comes to a specific kind of problem in a case such as Banco Santander. This, 
however, does not mean that they are unimportant in regard to the possible effects of a judicial 
decision in a general context. If the financial system in a certain jurisdiction allows a lot of 
possibilities for banks to fulfil ulterior motives, besides the role they are given, a single decision 
that does or does not limit such possibilities can potentially be important. 
We think that the risks described are relevant and that they point towards also allowing a judicial 
review at a late stage in the bank’s process of using the security to cover the debt. However, since 
these arguments concern the aggregate level we need to be careful. We should not let these 
arguments gain weight unless we also assume that high enough number of consumers will be 
concerned that an effect on the macro level sets in. The assumed consequences are only one set 
of arguments out of many that need to be considered. 
                                                                
122  Cf. supra, III.C.2. sub (iii), with references in note 100. 
123  Cf. supra, III.B. 
124  See supra, section III.C.2. sub (v) and (viii). 
125  See supra, section III.C.2. sub (iv). 
ALJ 2019 Wolfgang Faber/Claes Martinson 118 
 
4. Weighing the Arguments Concerning Possible Change of Behaviour 
As stated above, it is partly difficult to predict how banks will adapt their future behaviour 
depending on the decision on the ‘real issue’.126 We have already pointed out that we assume the 
most probable change in behaviour, if a judicial review at the present stage of proceedings were 
allowed, would be that the banks change their mortgage contracts so that they seem less unfair 
from an EU law perspective.127 This is an argument for allowing a review of the contract. The 
arguments that point in the opposite direction are, however, also plausible. We do not know how 
the banks will behave and how they will redesign their contracts. Yet it is important that we do not 
see a clear probability for a redesign of contract terms that is less desirable from either a consumer 
or market related perspective. 
5. Contemplating the Arguments Concerning the Overall Situation 
The last arguments we would like to involve concern the overall situation of the case. One aspect 
is that the bank might have been ‘kind’ to the consumer, for example by letting him or her stay in 
their apartment for a long time after the acquisition. According to Article 4(1) UCTD, this aspect 
should not be considered in the unfairness test, since it occurs after the contract was concluded. 
However, when taking into account the overall situation in a specific case, it might seem unrealistic 
to look away from such a fact. Accordingly, if the law requires disregarding this aspect, it is easier 
to do so after explicitly pointing out that this fact is in reality a part of the picture, although it should 
not be considered for specific legal reasons.128  
Another aspect of the overall situation is the question of whether it would be better for the 
consumer if the apartment was sold as quickly as possible. It is simply hard to know whether the 
outcome of an unfairness assessment makes the overall situation better for the consumer. There 
are a number of uncertainties, concerning for example the possibilities to sell the apartment for a 
higher price, and these uncertainties make a decision for or against trying the unfairness test risky 
for the consumer. It may be necessary to contemplate this when considering the circumstances at 
hand, but it is not an argument against a review as such.  
Concerning the overall situation we do, in summary, not see that these aspects should be decisive 
in the Banco Santander setting. 
6. A Possible Result of the Weighing Process 
Getting to the final step of the weighing process, we would like to stress once again that we are not 
in the position to decide the ‘true’ Banco Santander case, as it has been referred to the CJEU. A first 
reason is that we have simplified the case by picking some important elements and disregarding 
others.129 A second reason is that, as legal researchers, our intention is to show something of more 
general relevance. What we claim to show with this article is that there are reasons to consider the 
                                                                
126  See supra, section III.C.2. sub (vii) and, to some extent, sub (iii). 
127  See, again, sections III.C.2. sub (iii) and (vii). 
128  It can be noted that there is legislation in some jurisdictions that allows subsequent events to be a part of the 
unfairness assessment; see for example § 36 Swedish Contract Act (Avtalslagen), and the equivalents in the other 
Nordic countries. 
129  See supra, section I. 
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thought process suggested by the ‘functional approach’ when it comes to solving legal issues 
concerning (national) property law and EU consumer law. 
To illustrate this, we have, in the course of our analysis, disqualified some of the bearing arguments 
that were used by the CJEU and the AG. We have also developed arguments that point in the 
opposite direction. On balance, and within the limited facts we have opted to base our research 
task on, the arguments for solving the ‘real issue’ in favour of the consumer seem to prevail. 
Where the conflict is still only between the consumer-mortgagor and the bank as the acquirer of 
the former security object, a judicial review of potentially unfair terms in the security agreement 
need not at all be excluded. A possible result of the analytic process we have described is rather 
that such a judicial review should be allowed where the consumer herself asks the court to conduct 
it. There should arguably even be a duty on the national court to review the contract terms of its 
own motion where the following two conditions are met: First, the general preconditions for such 
ex officio review must be met – in the words of the CJEU: where the national court “has available 
to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that task”.130 Second, adopting such a duty would 
require that there has not yet been any adequate possibility for the consumer to raise objections 
herself or for a court to start a review of its own motion131 (or the previous court failed to comply 
with its duty).  
The main arguments for this solution are that the bank’s interests are impaired to a very small 
extent, whereas the consumer can potentially benefit considerably and the general goal of 
preventing the continued use of unfair terms is served in the best way possible. 
To what extent national law can exercise a limitative effect on this functioning of the Directive does 
not depend on whether the bank has acquired ‘ownership’ in a two-party conflict like in Banco 
Santander. Rather, variations as to the ‘operating distance’ of the Directive may, for instance, follow 
from the degree of a transfer’s dependency on the underlying obligation under national law (causal 
transfer system or other). Interestingly, this feature of national property law – i.e., taking into 
account a defect in the contract between the two parties involved – appears to be an aspect of 
rather relational character. 
IV. Impact on the Understanding of the EU Law Principle of Effectiveness 
We hope that the foregoing analysis managed to show that solving the issue raised in Banco 
Santander does not require drawing heavily on dogmatic concepts such as ‘ownership’, ‘rights in 
rem’, or specific types of procedures as established by national law. Rather, approaching the issue 
functionally suggests that formal categorisations of rights or procedures should not dominate the 
argumentation, particularly where they would become relevant only in a conflict between these 
two parties who happen to be the addressees of a specific EU consumer contract law directive. The 
approach we have applied narrows down the discussion to the parties involved and the interests 
that are actually at stake. At the same time it attempts to broaden the discussion to any kind of 
                                                                
130  See, among many others, CJEU, Case C-40/08 Asturcom paras. 53 and 59. 
131  Cf. the formulation of the ‘real issue’ with its variations (a) and (b) supra, III.B. at note 78. 
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argument potentially relevant within the narrow issue, and to provide a methodological framework 
for weighing these arguments against each other. The goal pursued in this weighing process, in a 
case like Banco Santander, is to determine a proper scope and effect of the principle of 
effectiveness, in order to achieve the goals of the UCTD in an appropriate manner. 
The issue we want to address in this final chapter of our article goes one step further. The issue is 
whether at least in a case like this one, that is, in a mere two-party relationship, EU law itself might 
actually require applying an approach which comes relatively close to the functional approach 
applied above. In particular, the principle of effectiveness appears to display a number of features 
resembling elements of the functional approach. In turn, reflecting on the functional approach 
might contribute to a better understanding, or even a further sharpening, of the application of the 
principle of effectiveness. Actually, it has been pointed out repeatedly that the vagueness presently 
displayed by the principle of effectiveness should be reduced.132 Evidently, to sharpen such a 
central principle is a comprehensive issue. The following observations and suggestions do not take 
the form of an in-depth discussion. Rather, they are intended to form a starting point for further 
research, and for debate. 
A. Normative Support for a Functional Approach in EU Law 
To begin with, the Court commonly states that every case in which the question as to whether a 
national procedural provision infringes the principle of effectiveness arises “must be analysed by 
reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed 
as a whole, before the various national bodies”.133 In other words, context and function do matter. 
There are also clear indications in CJEU case law that the Court, referring to the principle of 
effectiveness, turns against putting decisive weight into distinctions based on concepts and 
categorisations. For instance, the Court has declined an argumentation based on a formal 
distinction between ‘licence’ versus ‘sales’ contracts when dealing with the rule of exhaustion in 
copyright law.134 In other cases, which formally depend on the interpretation of a certain statutory 
notion or concept, the principle of effectiveness has been deployed for interpreting this notion 
flexibly in order to achieve the effects pursued by EU law.135 Further, it has been observed that the 
Court’s case law on the principles of equivalence and effectiveness reveals an approach of weighing 
procedural principles of national law against the goals of EU law. Based on this this understanding, 
any severe interference with the procedural autonomy of a Member State must be justified by 
particularly central interests of EU law.136 This very much resembles the idea of balancing different 
                                                                
132  See, e.g., Michael Dougan, The Vicissitudes of Life at the Coalface: Remedies and Procedures for Enforcing Union 
Law Before the National Courts, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 407, 420 (Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2nd 
ed., 2011); KRÖNKE, supra note 50, at 230. For further references, but less critical in her own assessment, see also 
KULMS, supra note 49, at 185 ff. 
133  See, for instance, CJEU, Case C-32/14 ERSTE Bank Hungary para. 51. 
134  See CJEU, Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. ECLI:EU:C:2012:407 para. 49. The 
observation that the mere denomination of the ‘type of contract’ cannot be decisive in the eyes of the CJEU is made 
by Christian Baldus and Thomas Raff, Richterliche Interpretation des Gemeinschaftsrechts, in ENZYKLOPÄDIE 
EUROPARECHT, BAND 6: EUROPÄISCHES PRIVAT- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 153, 202 (note 179) (Martin Gebauer and Christoph 
Teichmann eds., 2016). 
135  For a most recent example, see CJEU, Case C-724/17 Vantaan kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy, NCC 
Industry Oy, Asfaltmix Oy ECLI:EU:C:2019:204 paras. 43–51, regarding the concept of ‘undertaking’ within the 
meaning of Article 101 TFEU. The potentially conflicting concept of ‘legal persons’ (compare the referring court’s 
concerns in para. 15) was not considered decisive in solving the case. 
136  KÖNIG, sura note 49, at 240 ff. 
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normative propositions within a functional approach as outlined above. For example, a national 
procedural provision specifying the principle of res iudicata may be weighed against the principle 
of effective application of EU rules.137 Further, the CJEU has stressed in certain cases that in order 
to safeguard the effective functioning of EU law, it is essential that conflicting interests of 
individuals can be weighed against each other, having regard to all aspects of the case; and that 
provisions of national (procedural) law that do not allow such weighing of interests may fail to 
comply with the principle of effectiveness.138 This weighing of the parties’ interests, again, 
resembles a feature of the functional approach. This example also shows that the strength the 
principle of effectiveness ultimately assumes is heavily influenced by the balancing process. 
B. Possible Contributions by the Functional Approach 
To what extent may the functional approach contribute to the understanding and application of 
the principle of effectiveness? As we have just illustrated, balancing different normative 
propositions, including the principle of effectiveness itself, and weighing the interests of the 
individual persons involved in the particular conflict, can already be said to form part of the CJEU’s 
methodological toolbox for applying the principle of effectiveness. This has not always been fully 
clear, partly due by the Court’s own formulation that national courts are under an obligation to 
ensure that “full effect” (or similar) must be given to EU law,139 which may have been understood 
in terms of a one way preference rule.140 The functional approach presented in this article, and its 
ability to reach balanced solutions in a reflected manner, suggests that this kind of weighing 
process should be fostered and further developed. 
In addition, we believe that steps 1 and 2 of the functional approach as presented in section II.B. – 
keeping the different relations apart and defining the real issue without being occupied with 
dogmatic concepts – could be particularly helpful when applying the principle of effectiveness. One 
major benefit of these tools is gaining a clear picture of what is relevant, and what is not. Similarly, 
these tools may prove extremely useful for identifying to what extent different cases brought 
before the CFEU are comparable. This is an important task, given that EU law principles, like the 
principle of effectiveness, are developed by case law in a step-by-step-process. This usually 
involves the Court repeating its own statements when deciding a new case on the same matter. 
                                                                
137  See CJEU, Case C-2/08 Amministrazione dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Agenzia delle Entrate v Fallimento 
Olimpiclub Srl ECLI:EU:C:2009:506 paras. 28–31 (weighing a specific interpretation of a provision of the Italian Civil 
Code against the effectiveness of EU VAT provisions). For a closer analysis of the ‘balancing’ or ‘weighing’ approach 
applied in this case, see KRÖNKE, supra note 50, at 198 ff., 328 ff. See also, as to substance, CJEU, Case 453/00 Kühne 
& Heitz NV v Productschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren ECLI:EU:C:2004:17 paras. 24–27. 
138  See, e.g., CJEU, Case C-536/11 Donau Chemie AG and others ECLI:EU:C:2013:366 paras. 35 ff., regarding third-party 
undertakings’ access to files of judicial proceedings brought for infringements of EU competition law. Building on 
that decision’s reasoning, see also CJEU, Case C-365/12 P European Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-
Württemberg AG, Kingdom of Sweden, Siemens AG, ABB Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2014:112 paras. 104–109, 132; and, 
regarding the process of weighing up different interests in proceedings for interim relief, CJEU, order in Case C-
162/15 P-R Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2016:142 paras. 103–115 (in particular para. 
111). 
139  See, for instance, CJEU, Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt 
Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v Hauptzollamt Paderborn ECLI:EU:C:1991:65 para. 30. 
140  Cf. KRÖNKE, supra note 50, at 201 ff. For a detailed analysis of case law development, see THOMAS VON DANWITZ, 
EUROPÄISCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 476 ff. (2008). 
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However, these statements are also repeated when the matter of the new case resembles the old 
one to a limited extent only. The Court needs to start from somewhere. This, evidently, creates a 
risk that generalisations consolidate (as usually desired by lawyers), while differences as to the 
facts and interests involved tend to be overlooked. Steps 1 and 2 help to sharpen a lawyer’s 
awareness of these differences and the ability to transform them into (different) legally relevant 
questions, or ‘real issues’, with potentially different impacts on the principle of effectiveness. 
V. Conclusive Remarks 
This article has dealt with potential conflicts that may arise between national property law and EU 
law; in particular, with the requirement of effective application of the UCTD. According to several 
substantial segments of argumentation presented by the CJEU in its recent Case C-598/15 Banco 
Santander, the acquisition of ‘ownership’ of a mortgaged property in a forced sale may form a strict 
barrier to the review of potentially unfair contract terms in the mortgage agreement. We have 
attempted to show that this perception of the conflict between different norms (national versus 
European) is heavily determined by a thinking process built on the concept of an absolute right of 
‘ownership’. We have suggested using a ‘functional approach’ instead. This approach was, first, 
presented in an abstract manner and by way of a step-by-step instruction. Second, we have tried 
to exemplify this approach by applying it to a factual setting similar to the Banco Santander case. 
We hope that we have, thereby, managed to show that this functional approach offers an 
appropriate methodological framework to deal with the potentially conflicting norms and the 
interests of the parties involved in the conflict. We also hope it has become apparent that a 
functional approach fits rather well into the argumentative process of the CJEU when it comes to 
determining the appropriate scope of the principle of effectiveness of consumer contract law 
directives. 
What we have presented here are suggestions, a methodological contribution of academics to the 
common goal of enhancing judicial decision-making. We did not show that the CJEU decided the 
Banco Santander case in the wrong way. As mentioned, we did not base our analysis on the full set 
of facts, nor did we delve into the full complexity of Spanish procedural law (which the CJEU did 
not do either).141  
However, it is important to stress that the result achieved by the CJEU should not be overestimated 
when viewed from the perspective of other European legal systems. As pointed out in the course 
of our analysis, the Court’s argumentation does not include the idea of a ‘causal’ transfer of 
property rights, under which the acquisition of ownership may be flawed, and hence be rendered 
ineffective, because of unfair contract terms in the underlying mortgage agreement. Neither does 
the Court’s judgement offer any direct guidance for procedures under other national laws where 
the claimant is required to prove the rightful acquisition of ownership (as under the traditional rei 
vindicatio): the specific Spanish summary procedure applied in the present case does not offer any 
possibility to raise the issue of the claimant’s rightful acquisition.142 Had this aspect been different, 
                                                                
141  See section I.C. 
142  See sections I.C., III.A. sub (ii) and III.C.1. sub (ii). 
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much more would speak for a solution where the (flawed) acquisition of ownership does not 
provide closure. 
There are three more clarifications we would like to add. First, the functional approach employed 
in this article can be applied irrespective of how a specific national property law regime is designed. 
It is true that the approach is inspired by substantive Nordic and American laws, but this does not 
make it incompatible with other substantive property law regimes, including those where the 
concept of absolute rights in rem plays a central role. The kind of problem discussed in this article 
is, after all, not one of national property law. The problem emerges at the intersection of national 
property law and the requirement of effectively applying EU consumer contract law, where the 
question arises to what extent and at which point the one can limit the other. This is a matter of 
balancing. The functional approach is a tool for carrying out a balancing process in an open and 
reflected manner. 
Second, following this argumentation, it should be stressed that promoting a functional approach 
for the process described is not a (hidden) attempt to change national property laws that have not 
adopted this approach. National law may retain or adopt whatever approach national lawmakers 
prefer.143 Our only intent is to show that the functional approach’s way of reasoning and 
structuring problems is a useful method where the EU law principle of effectiveness clashes with 
national law. 
Third, the fact that we have applied the functional approach to a mere two-party situation inspired 
by the Banco Santander case should not be understood as an indication that this approach would, 
as such, be limited to two-party situations. It could, with advantage, also be used in settings where 
a third party is involved. Then the ‘real issue’ would be a different one. 
                                                                
143  See also section I.C. sub (iii). 
